Interfaith Solidarity Jihad

 

The excerpt below is taken from a recently published academic chapter  -https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-99-3862-9_13

Introduction: Jihad as an Obstacle to Interfaith Understanding and Practice

 

 

Probably one of the most contentious ideas, with a long and controversial historical pedigree, is the doctrine of jihad. It is considered a major threat to international order by the global north and a civilizational threat to western-liberal democracies (Cook, 2005; Egerton, 2011; Kepel, 2009;Li, 2020; Polk, 2018; Turner, 2014). Moreover, the term jihad has been used as one of the constellations of concepts that are emblematic of the threat (some) Muslims residing in the West are considered to pose to the liberal-democratic order of western societies (Egerton, 2011; Kepel, 2017; Tibi, 2014). As noted by Afsaruddin (2022), the term jihad, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, has become ubiquitous in non-academic mass media and popular discourses, as representing the image of the Muslim ‘other’. Since 9/11, the term jihad has been primarily employed to personify forces of civilizational and religious division, violence, and conflict. As such it would be fair to state that the term jihad quintessentially has functioned as a discourse that poses a major obstacle to inter-cultural and interfaith understanding and practice.

 

While not denying the many historical, civilizational, and doctrinal difficulties that the idea of jihad poses, this chapter provides a reconceptualization of jihad that can be employed for advancing interfaith understanding and practice, as embodied in our autobiographical accounts. The first section examines the central arguments and justifications for the classical military doctrines of jihad in the laws of war (siyar), including theories of jihad that are compatible with international humanitarian law. This is important since the concept of jihad is being primarily debated in this sense. In the second section, we outline alternative reframing of the concept of jihad in contemporary literature on Islam in a non-military context. In the third section, the concept of ‘nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad’ is introduced. Finally, we provide autobiographical accounts of our own engagement in nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad.

 

Military Concepts of Jihad

According to Al-Dawoody’s (2011) comprehensive discussion of classical Islamic jurisprudence and modern Islam, the term jihad is a general term for war. Etymo-logically, however, its meaning is much broader as it connotes “striving to achieve a laudable goal, either by doing something good or by abstaining from doing something bad” (Al-Dawoody, 2011, p. 76). Jihad is, therefore, “a broad concept that refers to acts related to both oneself and others” (Al-Dawoody, 2011, p. 76). Al-Dawoody (2011) provides various definitions of military jihad among major classical Islamic schools of thought (Hanafis, Malikis, Shafi’is, and Hanbalis) formulated around a millennium ago as follows:

 

According to the Hanaf¯ıjurists, jih¯ad means exerting one’s utmost effort in fighting in the path of God either by taking part in battle or by supporting the army financially or by the tongue. For the M¯alik¯ıs, jih¯ad means exerting one’s utmost effort in fighting against a non-Muslim enemy with whom Muslims have no peace agreement in order to raise the word of God, that is, to convey or spread the message of Islam. The Sh¯afi’¯ıs define jih¯ad as fighting in the path of God, while the Hanbal¯ıs simply define it as fighting against unbelievers (p. 76).

 

These approaches to the doctrine of militaryjihad were premised upon a particular understanding of the nature of international relations. It was assumed that the default state of affairs between politically sovereign entities was premised on war, unless there were explicit agreements stating otherwise. Moreover, the near complete confla-tion of political and religious identities as a marker of the period in which the classical doctrine of jihad was formulated also greatly affected the way in which classical Muslim jurists defined the doctrine of jihad (Al-Dawoody, 2011, pp. 78–102).

In addition to formulating a concept of a defensive war ( jih¯adal-daf’) as a personal duty of every capable person, all mainstream Sunni schools of thought also subscribe/ d to the idea of jih¯ad al-talab (offensive or pre-emptive war initiated by Muslims in non-Muslim territories) as a collective duty of Muslims (Al-Dawoody, 2011, p. 76). Jackson (2002) terms this type of jihad as “pro-active jihad” or “aggressive jihad” and, furthermore, argues that it “according to the majority, constituted a communal requirement to be carried out at least once every year” (p. 15).

 

There are two main viewpoints used by classical Sunni jurists to justify engaging in war with a non-Muslim entity (casus beli). A majority view is shared primarily by Hanafis and Malikis who consider only acts of aggression against Muslims as the operative cause. By contrast, Shafi’is and some Hanbalis ground it based on unbelief (kufr). Al-Dawoody (2011, p. 81) argues that the eponymous founder of one mainstream Shafi’i Sunni schools of thought, Al-Shafi’ (d. 204 AH), formulated the view that “a permanent state of war exists until non-Muslims accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule.” Therefore, the two mainstream Sunni classical positions regarding the legal justifications for recourse to war both have doctrines pertaining to “aggressive jihad” (Jackson, 2002, p. 15) or the term we prefer, namely ‘expansionist jihad.’ This type of jihad, as evidenced from the definitions and justifications provided, is always directed in relation to the non-Muslim other and was embedded in a broader Machiavellian political theology (Al-Dawoody, 2011, pp. 71–106). While the classical approaches to military expansionist jihad still strongly resonate with a plethora of jihadist groups, modern Muslim scholars, such as Abu Zahra (d. 1974), have rejected the doctrine of expansionistjihad rooted in the unbelief of the non-Muslim other. They have developed an Islamic international law which, in many ways, reflects international humanitarian law. Abu Zahra held that, in both times of peace and war, Islamic teachings, including jihad, are to operate within the confines of the following principles: safeguarding of human dignity; premised on the idea that all humans are one nation; any efforts that facilitate human cooperation, forbearance, freedom, including personal or group freedom, freedom of religion, and freedom of self-determination; efforts that encourage virtue either in time of peace or, specifically, during the conduct of war; efforts that are just, based on reciprocity, in accordance with pacta sunt servanda principle, advance forming of friendships and preventing tyranny (Al-Dawoody, 2011; cf. Afsaruddin, 2022). In this conceptual-ization by Abu Zahra, the jihad doctrine would be considered only valid if it abides by the above-outlined values. Needless to say, some of the classical formulations of military jihad doctrine in classical Islamic jurisprudence and political theology, unlike the one espoused by Abu Zahra, leave little to no room for an interfaith-based solidarity jihad.

In addition to providing definitions of jihad in the context of warfare, a useful way of understanding the nature of ‘military jihad’ in classical Islam is to divide it in reference at whom it is directed, namely non-Muslims and “heterodox” Muslims (Al-Dawoody, 2011, pp. 71–107). In this latter sense, there is a less well-known type of ‘military jihad’ in classical Islam that is aimed at Muslims. Al-Dawoody (2011, p. 77) terms this as “domestic jihad” which includes four types: fighting against bughah (rebels, secessionists); fighting against muharibun (bandits, highway robbers, pirates); fighting against ahl al-riddah (apostates); and religious fanatics/ extremists. This domesticjihad is very much reflective of the nature of early Islam and the various political and sectarian schisms among Muslims that left an indelible mark on Islamic intellectual history in general and Islamic jurisprudence and theology. This concept of ‘domestic militant jihad’ is important because it problematizes the idea that military jihad is always oriented toward the non-Muslim other which would prevent any viability of the concept of ‘interfaith solidarity jihad’ that we advocate.

 

Non-military Concepts of Jihad

Afsaruddin (2022) identifies and discusses a wide range of non-military alterna-tive forms of the meaning of jihad that punctuate the Islamic intellectual tradition, including the idea of jihad as spiritual, moral, activist, or intellectual-based struggle. In this section we provide a brief overview of additional usages of alternative, non-military meanings ofjihad in recent academic literature before discussing the concept of ‘nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad.’

There is the idea of ‘sexual jihad’ (Rinehart, 2019) in the context of understanding some of the motivations that saw the flocking of some Muslim women around the world to the so-called Islamic State as their sacred duty to support ‘militaryjihad’ and the establishment and expansion of the Caliphate. However, scholars such as Wadud (2006) and Shirazi (2009) use the concepts ‘gender jihad’ and ‘velvet jihad’to convey the idea of the struggle for gender-just interpretations of the Islamic tradition that provide an alternative to traditionalist and fundamentalist approaches to gender issues in Islam. The idea of ‘e-jihad’ discussed by Brunt (2003) points to the everyday efforts and struggle of Muslims in cyberspace to ‘fight’ for their cause however this is conceptualized. There is also literature on nonviolent, civilian-based, social justice-orientated jihad that describes efforts by ordinary Muslim citizens in places like the Middle East, Indonesia, and West Africa to bring about greater democratic transformations in their respective societies and for the purposes of peacemaking (Afsaruddin, 2022; Stephan, 2009).

 

The Concept of Nonviolent Interfaith Solidarity Jihad

The tragic events of 9/11 and subsequent developments triggered a widespread loss of life, multiple humanitarian crises, the significant flow of Muslim refugees and migrants into the West, the rise of Islamic extremism, increasing racism and xeno-phobia, and the rise of right-wing extremism. As a result, questions are being raised pertaining to the role of interfaith dialogue and solidarity in dealing effectively with these issues. This is evidenced in the exponential growth of academic liter-ature regarding the role of faith/religion in multiculturalism/politics/peacemaking/ international relations. There are also significant interfaith initiatives at local, national, and global levels that have been bringing together religious leaders, polit-ical leaders, policymakers, and academics (Patt, 2021). These interfaith dialogues and solidarity efforts are grounded in the belief that religion can be used as a source for achieving the common good and are conceptualized here as ‘nonviolent inter-faith solidarity jihad.’ We conceptualize ‘nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad’as encompassing two foci: (1) academic efforts to bring about a greater understanding of different faiths for the purposes of providing better understanding and harmony between the adherents of various religious traditions; and (2) activist endeavors to bring faith communities together to explore the practical possibilities of peaceful faith-based interfaith-shaped social justice-orientated activities to serve the common good. In what follows, we discuss examples of this ‘nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad’ in the context of post-9/11 Australia from autobiographical perspectives.

 

Adis Duderija’s Nonviolent Interfaith Solidarity Jihad—An Autobiographical Account

 

My involvement in interfaith dialogue in Australia goes back to my undergraduate days during the 1990s. At the age of eighteen, I settled in Perth, Western Australia, as a Bosnian refugee, with my parents and older brother. Over time, I became active in the Muslim Student Association at the University of Western Australia and various interfaith initiatives at the local level. My involvement in interfaith activities inten-sified after 9/11. While engaging in my postgraduate studies in contemporary Islam with an emphasis on interfaith and gender-related issues, I co-founded a local inter-faith group called Abrahamic Alliance (AA) in 2005. I co-led this for five years until the completion of my Doctor of Philosophy.

During that time, with my Christian, Muslim, and Jewish colleagues, we engaged in a variety of interfaith solidarity-based jihad activities, including organizing regular monthly meetings that attracted groups of twenty to thirty people, to larger and more official gatherings that attracted 150–200 people including religious leaders and clerics. In the spirit of nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad, the main aim of these initiatives was to bring Jews, Christians, and Muslims to meet face to face and eventually develop sufficient levels of trust that would enable the participants to discuss a variety of sensitive topics of both religious and political/activist nature.

My own interfaith solidarity jihad has been underpinned by the theory of progres-sive Islam that I have been developing in an academic setting for about fifteen years. This has resulted in many publications, most notably two sole authored monographs on the subject (Duderija, 2011, 2017). The main pillars of progressive Islam can be summarized as follows:

1.     creative, critical, and innovative thought based on epistemological openness and methodological fluidity;

2.     rationalist and contextualist approaches to Islamic theology and ethics;

3.     a human rights-based approach to Islamic tradition;

4.     contemporary approaches to gender justice;

5.     affirmation of religious pluralism;

6.     Islamic liberation theology; and

7.     Islamic process theology.

 

These pillars of progressive Islam align closely with the philosophy, vision, and mission of the Network for Spiritual Progressives (NSP) described below.

I left Australia in 2011 due to professional and personal reasons and upon my return, in 2017, with my co-author of this chapter, Dave Andrews, we co-founded an Australian chapter of the Network of Spiritual Progressive or NSP-Australia (The Network of Spiritual Progressives, 2022a). The mission, visions, and principles of NSP-Australia were adopted to our own local context. The NSP’s philosophy is succinctly described as follows:

 

Most people yearn for a world of love and real human connection and to live meaningful lives that transcend material well-being, that tie us to the ongoing unfolding of spirit and consciousness, and that connect us with the inherent interdependence and love that permeates and inspires all being. To achieve this world, we need a multifaceted revolution—political, moral, cultural and spiritual—that awakens us to the dignity and value of all peoples, regard-less of race, creed, gender, religion, class, where they’ve come from or what they’ve done, and helps us connect with the beauty and awe of the universe. This revolution must be grounded in love for all people, for life, and for the planet. (The Network of Spiritual Progressives, 2022b)

NSP’s vision is described in the following manner:

 

Our well-being depends on the well-being of everyone else on the planet and the well-being of the Earth. We seek a world in which all of life is shaped by peace, justice, environmental stewardship, love, care for one another, care for the earth, generosity, compassion, respect for diversity and differences, and celebration of the miraculous universe in which we live. (The Network of Spiritual Progressives, 2022c)

Its mission statement says:

 

To build a social change movement—guided by and infused with spiritual and ethical values—to transform our society to one that prioritizes and promotes the well-being of the people and the planet, as well as love, justice, peace, and compassion over money, power and profit. (The Network of Spiritual Progressives, 2022d).

NSP’s intellectual outlet is the magazine, Tikkun Olam, edited by Rabbi Micheal Lerner, to which I have had the pleasure of contributing on two occasions (Duderija, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c). Although the magazine is ‘Jewish’ in its core, it has a strong interfaith orientation and most of its contributors and editorial board members are not Jewish. The magazine is published by Duke University Press and has already reached thirty-five volumes and over 100 individual issues. The aim and nature of the magazine is described on its website as follows:

 

Tikkun is the voice of all who seek to replace the materialism, extreme individualism and selfishness of Western societies by creating the psychological, spiritual and intellectual foun-dations for the Caring Society: Caring for Each Other and Caring for the Earth. Tikkun offers a lively and easy-to-read critique of politics, mass culture, many of the debates in academia, and the still-deepening environmental crisis. And it is the preeminent North American maga-zine providing analytical articles on Israel and Palestine, latest issues in Jewish, Christian, Muslim and Buddhist religious theory and practice, and the intersection of religion and poli-tics in Western societies, as well as the inheritor of the hopefulness and commitment to an end to racism, sexism, homophobia, Islamophobia, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. We seek inner healing and radical nonviolent transformation of our globalized capitalist society. We are the magazine of liberal and progressive Jews, but also of every religion or none (atheists welcomed)—a universalism of the Judaism we affirm leads us to embrace all humanity—and that is reflected in the wide diversity of our readers and authors. (Tikkun, 2011)

Given the above, we consider the philosophy, vision, and mission of the NSP and Tikkun as exemplars par excellence of nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad. These tenants of progressive Islam as I theorize (Duderija, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c) are also in harmony with the fundamental premises of process-relational, open-relational theology that I will discuss next.

Since 2019, my interfaith solidarity jihad has been increasingly influenced by processes—relational and open theism-based theologies associated with the schol-arship of scholar-activists including John Cobb Jr, David Ray Griffin, Jay McDaniel, Patricia Adams Farmer, Bruce Epperly, Thomas Jay Oord, and Andrew M. Davis (Center for Open & Relational Theology, 2022; Center for Process Studies, 2020b).1 On its main website the Centre for Process Thought (CPS) lists religion and interfaith dialogue as one of its areas of focus and describes its approach as follows:

 

Process thought has had a significant impact in the area of theology, religion, and spirituality. From the work of theologians like John Cobb and Marjorie Suchocki, and the emergence of Process Theology (as well as Open-Relational Theology), the process worldview has inspired new formulations of the nature of God—including special attention to notions of power, love, and God’s relation to the world. As an organization committed to the promotion of the common good, CPS also has a long history as a leader in interreligious dialogue; understood as a practice toward mutual transformation and peace. (Centre for Process Studies, 2020a)

This description is consistent with our definition of nonviolent interfaith solidarity jihad with its focus on interfaith-based commitment to solidarity, peacemaking and the common good.