Monday, December 2, 2019

REVIEW OF Zahra Ayubi. Gendered Morality: Classical Islamic Ethics of the Self, Family, and Society


REVIEW OF Zahra Ayubi. Gendered Morality: Classical Islamic Ethics of the Self, Family, and Society .New York, NY: Columbia University Press, August 2019. 336 pages. $35.00. Paperback. ISBN 9780231191333.
Unedited version .To appear in Reading Religion 
By: Dr. Adis Duderija, Senior Lecturer in the Study of Islam and Society, Griffith University
a.duderija@griffith.edu.au

Over the last few decades a number of important scholarly discussions on the highly  gendered  ( in a patriarchal sense) nature of Islamic intellectual tradition  have been written but whose focus primarily has been on the Islamic legal tradition (fiqh) ( e.g. K.Ali,  A. Chaudhry, A.Mahellati )  and to a lesser extent Qur’anic commentary (tafsir) ( e.g. K. Bauer , A.Geissenger). Ayubi’s remarkably well written and comprehensively referenced book provides further evidence of the same dynamics at play in the context of exploring three most influential writers of the akhlaq (Islamic philosophical ethics) genre from the  classical  period , namely Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali ( d.1111 CE), Nasir ad-din Tusi ( d.1274) and Jalal al-din Davani ( d.1502). Ayubi ‘s major argument in the book is that “the Muslim ethicists’ gendered understandings of existence and metaphysics compelled them to produce virtue ethics that are rooted in inequality and, as such, are unsustainable by the standards of their own ethics” (p.6). In other words, Ayubi uncovers a paradoxical tension between the classical Muslim ethicists’ deeply patriarchal, androcentric and at times misogynistic approach to virtue ethics and their professed metaphysical commitments premised on ideas of (Divine) justice and human equality.
Ayubi identifies and analyses expertly three central themes that animate gender-related discussions in the classical akhlaq genre, namely: i.) “tension between hierarchical power and justice”; ii.) “the construction of instrumental femininity in relation to rational masculinity, and iii.) the construction of elite masculinity in the context of homosocial relationships among men” (p.7).
She delves deeply into the classical Muslim ethicists’ discussions of virtue ethics of the self, marriage and society and painstakingly deconstructs the assumptions that underpin their concepts of masculinity and femininity informed as they are by highly gendered and patriarchal Islamic cosmology. Here we see many parallels with discussions found in other genres of Islamic interpretive tradition such as tafsir and fiqh from the classical period that associate masculinity conceptually with, among others, religious and political authority and rationality  and femininity with not only the lack of these  but also with a highly potent and  socio- morally eroding  sexuality that is to be tightly controlled and supervised by men through a variety of mechanisms and practices ranging from strict gender segregation to veiling, to curbing of women’s freedom of movement and the placing of strong limits on decision-making power of women in relation to both public and private matters.
The book’s most original part is its final, fifth chapter (which also is its conclusion) that is titled “The  Prolegomenon to Feminist Philosophy of Islam”. Here Ayubi provides a systematic and very erudite analysis of how to move beyond the patriarchal Islamic philosophical ethics and the various pre- suppositions underpinning it that she described so lucidly in the first four of the book’s chapters. In this chapter Ayubi draws superbly upon both authorities on feminist philosophy of religion in general (e .g.Irigary, Daly etc.) and what we could term the proponents of  Islamic feminism specifically ( Shaikh, wadud etc.). Ayubi identifies and brilliantly discusses four “interrelated philosophical problems” posed by “male-centred akhlaq” that include: “i.) the the problem of having an exclusionary definition of humanity based on fixed hierarchy of rational capacity; ii.) the problem of patriarchal, and therefore unjust notions of khilafah(vicegerency) ; iii.) The problem of the emergence of new hierarchies in addressing exclusion on the basis of gender in akhlaq; and iv.) the problem of individual refinement though the utilization of women and nonelite others. “(p.253).  In this respect she argues that feminist philosophy-based approaches to religion can play an important role in “exploring possible resolutions” (p.254). More specifically, Ayubi argues for a redefining of rationality and the need for a “liberating reason” (p.254) that has an inclusive, non-gender hierarchical and non-gender exclusive view of humanity. For Ayubi, like for other feminist-minded Muslim scholars such as wadud and Barlas, the conceptualisation of a non-patriarchal and therefore non-gendered  concept of khilafah  is also necessary to move beyond the limits of elitist male-centric akhlaq. Furthermore, given that patriarchal Islamic philosophical ethics is built on “interlocking hierarchies” ( i.e. gender and class ) ( p.270), therefore, the need to incorporate  insights from the academic study of  intersectionality in general and black feminist philosophers, in particular, is identified by Ayubi as very useful for the purposes of developing the feminist philosophy of Islam. Finally, Ayubi ably argues that to move beyond the male centred akhlaq it is also important to problematise its very goals , which, as noted above, are based on the logic of  instrumentalization of non-elite men for elite men’s ethical refinement(p.275).
In my engagement with gender issues in Islam I have similarly argued that to dislodge patriarchal interpretations of the Islamic intellectual tradition it is important to develop a gender egalitarian paradigm that would involve the following: i.) Engendering alternative conceptualisations of gender cosmologies based on reciprocal and non-hierarchical relationships; ii.) Rethink the very nature and the conceptual relationship between masculinity and femininity where masculinity and femininity are not considered as binary opposites( disguised in form of gender complementary terminology ); and iii.) Reconceptualization of the concept of honour itself that delinks the honour of men from the sexual or sexually-perceived behaviour of ‘their women-folk’(Duderija, 2019).
I think that Ayubi’s book under review has a lot to offer in relation to the first two points in particular but that it lacks theoretical insights in relation to the role of patriarchal understandings of female sexuality and male honour that inheres in male-centred akhlaq. In this author’s view these ideas and concepts are one of the lynchpins that underpin the patriarchal expressions of the Islamic tradition which must be deconstructed and newly reconstructed for any future viable feminist philosophy of Islam.
I recommend this book to advanced undergraduates, postgraduates and academics working in the broad field of Islam and Gender, Gender and Religion and more specifically feminist approaches (philosophy) to religion/ Islam.

References:
A.Duderija. 2019.  “Using Progressive Muslim Thought to Take Down Patriarchy”, Tikkun 34(1):96-102. ( free PDF)

Thursday, October 17, 2019

How to Defeat the Clash of Extremisms: Civilisational Hybridity and Trust Building in the Multicultural West


How to Defeat the Clash of Extremisms:   Civilisational Hybridity and Trust Building in the Multicultural West
 Dr. Adis Duderija
In my talk, I would like to highlight how the concept of civilisational hybridity and efforts aiming at building of trust along  religious lines as exemplified  by the event we are commemorating  this evening can help counter the harmful effects of  the two most prevalent and arguably  most pernicious, but unfortunately not only,  forms of extremism today  namely ethno-nationalism  associated with white supremacist groups  and religious associated with violent Islamic radicalism. I will do so from a historically informed perspective of examining the historical nature of the civilisational interactions between the Arabo-Islamic civilisation and that of the Latin Christian West.

1.     The Clash of Extremisms:
In the 1990s in the the aftermath of the Cold War the concept of the Clash of Civilisations gained traction among some political scientists and historians of international relations in the West that among others postulated that one of the likely future forms  of civilisational conflict will be between the civilisation associated with the concept of liberal, democratic  West and the Islamic Civilisation. While this idea was dismissed by many academics and policymakers as too simplistic and not reflective of the internal diversity and fragmentation of both of civilisational spheres events such as 9/11 and the subsequent so-called War on Terror seemed to have given legitimacy to this idea of the Clash of Civilisations. My position in this regard is that we are currently experiencing what could be called the Clash of Extremist ideologies based on strong ethno-nationalist and religiously supremacist sentiments whose views of the Other are premised on   strongly essentialist and totalitarian perspectives.
For example, on the one hand, as evident in their manifestos, white supremacist groups want us to believe that:

1.Islam is an inherently violent political  ideology bent on world domination;

2.that Muslims in the West all subscribe to this ideology either overtly or covertly;

3.that Muslim immigrants, many of whom (like me) are refugees and have fled horrific conflicts in their own countries of origin, are single-mindedly focused, not  on rebuilding their lives and living in peace with their fellow citizens, but on transforming the West into an ISIS utopia.

Furthermore, white supremacist groups use major episodes from premodern history of  Islam-West relations ― such as the conquering of Constantinople by the Ottomans ― as evidence of the perpetual threat all Muslims pose to the  Western civilisation.
Moreover, an important element in the master narrative underpinning the ideology of these groups is their disdain for multiculturalism and pluralism which they view as avenues of Trojan Horse-like Islamic takeover of Europe.

One the other hand some of the master narratives of the Islamists terrorist organisations such as ISIS are that :

1.there is only one true Islam;

2. that their interpretation of Shari’a― including their understanding of the institution of the caliphate, ― is the only legitimate understanding of the canonical Islamic texts;

3.that it is the duty of Muslims in the West ― in peaceful and, in times of war, non-peaceful ways ― to support the establishment of the universal Caliphate as Islamist militants understand it;

4.that Muslims’ political loyalty to such a Caliphate overrides their rights and responsibilities as citizens of Western democracies, whose values are considered as antithetical to those of the "Islamic" principles.

Last year, my colleague Halim Rane and I published a book in which we tried to provide a comprehensive overview of the most significant research pertaining to various aspects of Islam and Muslims in the West over the last three decades or so. The book among others, documents

1.the complicated history and the nature of the relationship between Arab-Islamic and Latin Christian civilisations;

2.the multitude of ways of being a Muslim in the West and how these different ways of being a Muslim interpret the Islamic tradition very differently;

3.and the various efforts of contemporary Muslims in the West to integrate into Western liberal societies, including the articulation of a conceptually and culturally distinct form of Western Islam.

The book’s findings show how the earlier mentioned views of the extremists and their respective ideologies are significant distortions of the actual reality.
Given the nature of the today’s occasion I would like to spend a little time to first examine the history and the nature of the relationship between Arab-Islamic and Latin Christian civilisations before I offer some thoughts of how to counter this Clash of Extremisms.
There is no denying that the much of the history of the relationship between the Arab-Islamic and Latin-Christian civilisation was dominated by two political-military superpowers which were often engaged in conflict and did so while firmly holding onto their respective religious dogmas and views of the Religious Truth.
But even during the darker periods of this conflict there were examples of positive interactions and attempts at rapprochement and mutual understanding  as evident in the event that is being commemorated this evening. But this is not the only example even within the context of what the historians has called the Crusades.
A  distinguished professor of Middle Easter medieval History professor Suleiman Mourad has shown that  the time period of the Crusades from the perspective of  what the medieval  Muslim sources tell us is not just a mindless recounting of  countless battles that marked this  two centuries-long period , but  also of “ innumerable political and military alliances, systematic sharing of sacred spaces, commercial dealings, exchange of science and ideas, etc., between Muslims and crusaders”. He provides an example of a Muslim chronicler and historian Ibn Wasil (d. 1298) who spent two years in southern Italy on a diplomatic mission in early 1260s. During his stay there ibn Wasil wrote a book on logic in the honour of emperor Manfred of Hohenstaufen, the last King of Sicily.
Mourad also tells us of a story of Emperor Manfred’s father, Frederick II, who  regularly wrote  to Muslim scientists asking for scientific information, and that it was precisely under his command  of the  Sixth Crusade in 1228-1229, that he negotiated a peace  treaty with Sultan al-Kamil that allowed the Muslims and Crusader Christians  to share Jerusalem. According to this agreement “the Christians had full control of their religious places while the Muslims maintained control over their sacred places in the city and the surrounding villages.”
Moving beyond the mere describing of the historical incidents that demonstrate cooperation and mutual understanding between Islam and the West there are strong reasons to argue for the conceptual viability of the  idea of an Islamo-Christian Civilisation as a historical reality as I shall argue later.
The Case for Civilisational Hybridity
As noted earlier the Clash of Extremisms is based, among other things, on the idea of what can be called the defence of civilisational purity thesis according to which The West is very different from the Islamic Civilisation and the values defining these two civilisational entities are mutually exclusive or at least exist in great tension on many very significant  socio-political, cultural and existential issues.  The question that needs to be asked here is to what extent are these views actually representative of the historical realities?
Upon closer reflection on the matter it becomes quickly evident that it is impossible to outline the contours and characteristics behind the historical and intellectual relationship between western-European and Arabo-Islamic “intercivilisational constellations’ in a straightforward and continuous manner.
A contemporary British scholar of cosmopolitanism Gerard  Delanty, in fact, identifies three “modes” of western-European ways of relating to “Islam”, namely the mode of fear and xenophobia; the mode of fantasy and moral superiority; and lastly, the mode of “of borrowing, translation and adaptation.”
Delanty argues further that each of these “modes” have been co-present at various points in time at varying levels of prominence and prevalence.  The worldview underpinning contemporary right-wing radical groups centres squarely onto the first mode, that of fear and xenophobia and completely discards the third mode which here I will term civilizational hybridity. Importantly, the first mode of fear is not simply to be conceptualised in terms of western non-Muslim citizens security concerns from potential terrorist violence perpetrated by minority (immigrant) Muslims. It is a fear that runs much deeper and pertains to the question regarding as one scholar puts it “the essential nature of European culture, and what role the Muslim presence is likely to play in it” (Hellyer 2010:3). This fear has been elsewhere described as fear of Eurabia and/or Islamisation of the West/Europe (Bangstad: 2014).

As one way of countering the narratives and the worldview of both right-Wing and Islamist extremists in the rest of my talk I would like to highlight the work of but one among many  influential scholars who have critiqued the idea of Western/ European civilizational distinctiveness and have emphasised the symbiotic links between the formation of Arabo-Islamic and Western  “civilizational constellations” ( Delanty 2019). 

 One of the most systematic proponents of this approach is Professor Richard Bulliet, a noted historian of the Middle East. His main thesis is that the Arabo-Islamic civilisation should be considered in many ways constitutive of that of a Latin/Western Christian civilisation, because of the numerous, robust, and mutually defining cross-cultural interactions that have been taking place over a period spanning nearly a millennium and a half. For Bulliet these linkages are multifaceted and are evident at historical, scientific, cultural, philosophical, doctrinal, and scriptural levels (Bulliet 2004, 6, 45). As such Bulliet states that:

The past and future of the West cannot be fully comprehended without appreciation of the twinned relationship it has had with Islam over some fourteen centuries. The same is true of the Islamic world (2006, 45).

Furthermore, Bulliet provides ample evidence that there are stronger arguments for the conceptual viability of the idea of an Islamo-Christian civilisation rather than just that of a Judeo-Christian one. The latter is nowadays taken largely as self-evident and unproblematic in the West, although for a very long time this was not the case (Ibid., 5–6).  Indeed, the phrase Judeo-Christian  civilisation as a marker of a Western civilisation was coined in the 1930s  and it took several decades for it to become more widely accepted. Bulliet argues that in addition to having strong scriptural and doctrinal commonalities, the Arabo-Islamic and Latin Christian civilisations have had a long history of civilisational cross-pollination without which our present (post-) modern would not have been/ be possible.  In Bulliet’s own words:

Common scriptural roots shared theological concerns, continuous interaction at a societal level, and mutual contributions to what in modern times has become a common pool of thought and feeling give the Euro-American Christian and Jewish communities solid grounds for declaring their civilizational solidarity. Yet the scriptural and doctrinal linkages between Judaism and Christianity are no closer than those between Judaism and Islam, or between Christianity and Islam; and historians are well aware of the enormous contributions of Muslim thinkers to the pool of late medieval philosophical and scientific thought that European Christians and Jews later drew upon to create the modern West. (Ibid., 6).

Importantly, Bulliet uses this shift in consciousness about thinking in terms of Judeo-Christian civilisation that occurred as I previously  mentioned  as recently as 80 years ago or so  to further argue that historical legacies of long-standing periods of antagonisms between the Christian West and the Arabo-Islamic civilisations ( Duderija and Rane,2019), must not be considered as being tantamount to historical destinies (Bulliet, 2004: 5-6).

Therefore by  affirming the concept of  Islamo-Christian civilisation we emphasise the idea of civilisational hybridity that problematises the worldview  and the metanarratives underpinning both forms of extremism, ethno-nationalist and jihadist.

The Question of Trust and the Robustness of Multicultural Societies:
However , to adequately deal with the challenges  of the Clash of Extremisms  we need to go beyond theory that affirms civilisational  hybridity and  also develop  a practice-based ethic whose foundation is founded on trust as a means of  countering fear and distrust of the perceived Other and related processes such as Islamophobia or what we could call Occidentalism . Here I borrow the definition of trust as defined by one of the scholars of British multiculturalism as   “an investment of belief in reciprocal socially-oriented intentions and actions in another (or others)” (Morey,2018,3). Such a view of trust is based on principles of mutual reliance, accountability, and reciprocity (Ibid) and presupposes that the best interests of others will be compatible with ours”. This approach to trust and specifically trust in diversity and multiculturalism should be viewed therefore as a form of lived experience of cultural diversity and not simply just as a political and legislative policy. This approach to trust is, in fact, essential for the stability and robustness of multicultural and diverse societies such as those in the ‘West’ . As noted by a scholar of British multiculturalism:


All successful relationships are built on trust, as all successful societies must also be. Trust offers an important lens through which one can understand relations between Muslim and non-Muslim at this fraught moment in history (Morey 2018: 2).
Holding events such as the one this evening but also those that promote intercultural dialogue respect and understanding and indeed the civilisational  interconnectedness and interdependence of  entire humanity  is a perfect opportunity to cultivate this  trust, especially in multiculturally diverse societies such as Australia.

In conclusion:
In conclusion what we can we do counter the Clash of Extremisms? I will not pretend that I have definite answers to the often very complex processes that are relevant in relation to this Clash but  I did offer a few pointers.
First, as far as countering Islamicist-based extremism  is concerned, we must dismantle the theology of empire in Islamic fundamentalism and its scriptural/hermeneutical roots, embedded in the pre-modern Caliphate model that is alive among some Muslims that views the world through the lens of subjugation and domination of (certain kinds of) Muslims over non-Muslims and "heterodox Muslims." That kind of thinking will inevitably exacerbate  ethno-nationalist sentiments  as a manifestation of an already existing residual racist/xenophobic worldview among some non-Muslims that reared  its ugliest head in the genocide of Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica in 1995. Second, we have to promote the idea of civilisational cross-pollination and hybridity in contrast to the myth of civilisational purity. We have to understand that no civilisation can emerge, develop or be the product of its own internal dynamics. History testifies to this repeatedly, especially in relation to the civilisational interactions between the Arabo-Islamic and Latin Christian civilisation. Third, as recent studies in the context of Islamophobia have shown, regular everyday face-to-face interaction between Muslims and non-Muslims is a very important way of curbing prejudice. The lack of trust and confidence in multiculturalism and diversity can be found  in both forms of extremism discussed here as evident in the manifestos written by ethno-nationalist inspired terrorists  who repeatedly  condemn  multiculturalism as the Trojan Horse of Islamisation of Europe or the willingness of groups like ISIS to exploit feelings of discrimination and marginalisation present among some Muslims in the West as a lure  to join their totalitarian cause. Therefore, fostering relationships that strengthen trust based on principles of mutual reliance and reciprocity between Muslim citizens of the West and western societies of which they are an integral part of is an additional, and in my view crucial element in helping resolve the phenomenon of the clashes of extremism. Moreover, we ought to acknowledge the diversity and complexity of "the Other" as individual members of their own diverse communities. Finally, we have to remember that diversity and inherent equality of all human beings, underpinned by a set of commonly shared values and principles, is a normal and desirable part of human existence, and then inculcate these principles among our children and youth.

The meeting of St. Frances and Sultan Al-Kamil 800 years ago that happened under very trying circumstances teaches us that at the time when Extremisms are on the rise we also need to rise to the occasion and do our own part in upholding, embodying and promoting the values of trust, diversity and hybridity at both individual and societal levels.

Monday, March 18, 2019

MY OP ED ON CHRISTCHURCH MASSACRE

MY OP ED ON CHRISTCHURCH MASSACRE: One paragraph ( below) is missing and will be added :
"Some want us to believe that white supremacism has been a reaction to and wouldn't exist if there was no Islamist terrorism. While there is a link between the two, we should not forget that white supremacism existed much earlier and that its victims both in the recent and not so recent past have been Jewish and African American communities".

Thursday, March 7, 2019

Using Progressive Muslim Thought to Take Down Patriarchy

the very exciting new issue of Tikkum Olam on "Beyond Patriarchy" is out ' ( with a contribution of my own on "Using Progressive Muslim Thought to Take Down Patriarchy" )....I highly recommend this magazine to all progressive minded people: https://newsstand.joomag.com/en/tikkun-winter-2019-341/0328395001551904165

Saturday, February 23, 2019

Ḥadith at the Time of Shafiʾi, Ahmed Ibn Ḥanbal and Beyond:Nature,Extent and Importance




 The increase in volume and importance of Ḥadith in the theological and legal interpretation of the Qurʾān and Sunnah induced in the coming generations a frame-of mind in which it was expected that “ever new Ḥadith should continue to come into existence in new situations to face novel problems—social, moral, religious.” The champion and proponent of this Ḥadith-based Qurʾānico-Sunnahic hermeneutic was Shafiʾi. Shafiʾi’s insistence on Sunnah being only in a written form with an authentic isnād going (in most cases) back to the Prophet diminished the value of the ijtihād–ijmāʿ element inherent in the concept of ʿamal- and oral-based Sunnah, and its overall importance in evolution of legal hermeneutic development, and substituted it with that of Ḥadith-based one.126 Noticing this conceptual shift in Sunnah, Rahman asserts that:

Whereas Sunnah was largely and primarily a practical phenomenon, geared as it was to behavioural norms, Ḥadith became the vehicle not only of legal norms but of religious beliefs and principles as well.

In other words, the largely ʿamal-based, ethico-religious or value-objectivebased and non-written-dependent concept of Sunnah that existed at the time of the first three generations of Muslims now became increasingly viewed as being qualitatively and quantitatively identical to specific, edified and static view of the Sunnah as reflected in proliferating Ḥadith. This process was, however, not entirely complete. Shafiʾi madhhab indeed differed from the ʿahl-ul-hadith movement (as well as Ḥanafi and Maliki madhhab) spear-headed by Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal on several hermeneutic principles so that the former was described as semi-traditionalist whilst latter was referred to as traditionalist. Maliki and Ḥanafi madhahīb were usually referred to as rationalist.

Ibn Ḥanbal, the major proponent of ʿahl-ul-ḥadith movement’s purely Ḥadith-based Sunnahic hermeneutic restricted the scope of non-textual and non-literal interpretations of the Sunnah (and the Qurʾān) which still featured to some extent in Shafiʾi thought even further. His approach to the concept of Sunnah is clearly demonstrated in his treatise Tabagatul Ḥanaabilah in which he states: And the Sunnah with us are the aathaar (narrations) of the Prophet” (wa-s-sunnatu ʿindana atharu resulillah). Moreover, in terms of epistemologico-methodological value and interpretational tool of Ḥadith, Ḥanbal maintains that: “the Sunnah (i.e. athar/ Ḥadith) explains and clarifies the Qurʾān (wa-s-sunnetu tufassiru-l-qurʾaan) . . . there is no analogical reasoning in the Sunnah and the examples are not to be made for it” (wa laisa fi-s-sunneti qiyyas, wa la tudhrebu laha al-amthal). Nor is it [Sunnah] grasped and comprehended by the intellects or the desires (wa la tudreke bi-l-ʿuquli wa la-l ahwaʾ).
Thus, Sunnah was epistemologically and methodologically self-identified with Ḥadith/athar and was considered as supreme commentary upon the already earlier discussed deutungsbeduerfigkeit of the Qurʾān.

This period also witnessed for the first time the ordering of Ḥadith books solely according to legal subjects going back to the Prophet, such as Bukhari’s and Muslim’s Saḥ ̣īḥayn (pl. of Saḥ ̣īḥ). The criticism of Ḥadith literature, however, has since continued135 so that the science of ʿulum-ulḥadith saw its efflorescence in the works of later authorities such as AlBaghdadi (d. 463 AH), Al-Salah (d. 643 AH) and Al-Nawawi (d. 676 AH). It may therefore not come as a surprise to note that the most authentic Ḥadith compendia, such as those of Bukhari and Muslim, contain Ḥadith that were subsequently identified as weak (ḍaʿīf ) or which did not fulfill some of the pre-requisites of authenticity for a Saḥ ̣īḥ Ḥadith.”

The major juristic works of this time still did not exhibit the purely Ḥadith-based Sunnah hermeneutic. Indeed, Calder argues that all of the early Ḥanafi texts on law (based on the writings of Abu Ḥanifa, Abu Yusuf and Shaybani) Kitab-ul-ʿAsl or Mabsūt “displays a minimum quantity ̣ of Prophetic Ḥadith.” Additionally, “a real systematic interest in the hermeneutic argument based on appeal to Prophetic Ḥadith can hardly be demonstrated for the Ḥanafi tradition prior to the corpus of works ascribed to Al-Tahtawi (d. 321 AH).”

Calder’s analysis of Sahnun’s (160-240 AH) Mudawwana, a juristic work from the Maliki school of law, also lead him to the following conclusion: Of material or literary forms which suggest that the law is hermeneutically derived from the Prophetic Ḥadith there are only hints throughout the Mudawwana . . . Prophetic Ḥadith are relatively few and it is difficult to accept that there was a widespread recognition of the authority of Prophetic Ḥadith for legal purposes. The same author based on the study of Muzan’s (d. 264 AH) Mukhtasar, a Shafiʾī school of law juristic composition, asserts that the author “refers to Ḥadith but rarely in full and never gives an isnād.” Lucas in this context asserts that “prior to the mid-third century the majority of the material found in the sunnan books was not prophetic reports and consisted instead of sahabi and tabiʾi athar. . . .”


 Conclusion

 This article attempts to present a brief chronological analysis of the development of the Sunni Ḥadith literature and the concept of an authentic Ḥadith. The article has focused in particular on the question as to what extent the classical definition of the concept of Sunnah can be seen to embody the concept of Sunnah as it was understood during the formative period of Islamic thought. Relevant, recent Western scholarship found in literature was used in order to shed light on this issue. In this context, the extent, importance and nature of Ḥadith literature as well as the developmental stages of an authentic Ḥadith, during the first four generations of Muslims, have been investigated. The findings presented herein suggest that the writing of Prophetic reports probably took place even during the Prophet’s time, although the conditions for its widespread writing, transmission and proliferation were not favourable, not only in relation to circumstances surrounding the Prophet’s life but also on the basis of cultural preferences for oral transmission of knowledge. This led Juynboll to assert that the volume of Ḥadith literature remained very small during  the first century.142 Moreover, its importance during this period of time as source of law against the regional concepts of Sunnah was negligible. A marked growth in the corpus of Ḥadith literature, although still not in its ‘authentic form’, took place from the middle of the second century. It was during this period of transition that an epistemologico-methodological shift in the concept of Sunnah was becoming ever more prominent. Consequently, this resulted in its more frequent semantic association with Ḥadith. However, as Souaiaia demonstrated in relation to Islamic inheritance laws during the formative period of Islamic thought, spanning the first two and one half centuries or so, traditions from the Prophet in form of Ḥadith as defined by classical ʿulum-ul-ḥadith sciences could not alone produce an adequate framing of inheritance laws.As such, even towards the end of the second century, Sunnah and Ḥadith were seen as conceptually different terms. Due to his effort to bring more uniformity into the largely divergent legal theories in various regions of the Muslim empire, Shafiʾi was the first second-century-born jurist to narrow down the concept of Sunnah to that of an ‘authentic Ḥadith’ usually going back to the Prophet. This conceptual alteration in Sunnah provided by Shafiʾi was brought to its logical extreme, accepted and further consolidated by Ahmed ibn Ḥanbal. It is his literal, decontextualised, reason-condemning bilā kaifa (‘without asking how’) approach to ‘authentic Ḥadith’ as sole repository, conveyer and ultimate interpretational tool of Sunnah that is implied by the muḥaddithūn’s classical definition of the concept of Sunnah which did not correspond to the way the concept of Sunnah was understood by the first four generations of Muslims but is still prevalent in the majority mainstream Muslim community.

taken from this article ( Free PDF)


Saturday, February 16, 2019

Ḥadith at the Time of Successors up to and including Shafiʾi (130-200 AH): Extent, Nature and Importance



 We have previously briefly noted the reasons for increased ‘Ḥadithification’ of the concept of Sunnah. We refer to these as the forces of traditionalisation that were responsible for the paradigm shift in the way in which not only the concept of Sunnah came to be understood but also the entire subsequent Islamic thought. The process of traditionalisation is defined here as those social, political and jurisprudential mechanisms that throughout the second century of Hijrah contributed to:

 1. the gradual shift in formulation, preservation and transmission of knowledge from the oral to the written mode in general and, as a corollary, the continued growth and proliferation of Ḥadith;

2. the increased perceived importance given to Ḥadith at the cost of the ethico-moral and ʿamal-based concept of Sunnah;
 3. the absorption of practical and oral-based Sunnah into Ḥadith;
4. the increased application of Ḥadith in Qurʾānic and Sunnahic sciences such as tafsīr, ʿusūl-ul-fiqh ̣ and ʿusūl-as-sunnah ̣ including theology and ʿaqīdah; and
 5. the development of hierarchical, literal legal hermeneutic models that were entirely textually based (i.e. based on the Qurʾān and Ḥadith) and the marginalisation of non-textually based epistemologicomethodological tools of Sunnah (and Qurʾān) such as notions about of raʾy and ijtihād.

However, this process of traditionalisation during the first half of the second century of Hijrah still did not appear to be dominant. For example, according to Motzki who analysed the content of Abdarrazaq’s (d. 211 AH) Musannaf which contains materials from Ibn Abbas (d. 68 AH) and his disciples, only 14% of Ibn Juraij’s (d. 150 AH) text collections were based on Prophetic aḥādīth, not all of which were considered binding but only those which were seen to be in accordance with the established Meccan tradition. In this context he argues that:

 Propheten aḥādīth haben [daher] auch in der ersten Haelfte des 2. Jahrhunderts im mekkanischen Fiqh nur eine untergeordnete Rolle gespielt.
(During the first half of the second century hijri the hadith of the prophet played a very modest role  in Meccan fiqh.)

It is also worth mentioning that of those 14%, less then one half of the Ḥadith going back to the Prophet had a complete isnād and for those aḥādīth whose chain of narrators stopped at the level of the Companions had even a lesser number of complete isnād.  It is during the last half of the second century that the above-stated traditionalisation forces started to be felt more markedly. Therefore, this period can be rightfully described as a period of transition between regional non-Ḥadith-dependent concept of Sunnah and emerging concept of Ḥadith-based Sunnah. What was the attitude of major authorities on law towards this phenomenon, especially with regard to Ḥadith-based Sunnah proliferation?

When talking about the same period under examination in terms of Ḥadith-independent Sunnah, the opinion of Abu Yusuf was quoted as to his attitude with regard to the problem of ever-expanding Ḥadith literature. This methodology is also repeated in another passage found in Abu Yusuf’s work al-Radd ʿalā Siyar al-Awzaʾi in which he states: Ḥadith multiplies so much so that some Ḥadith are traced back through chains of transmission are not well known to legal experts, nor do they conform to Qurʾān and Sunnah. Beware of solitary Ḥadith and keep close to the collective spirit of Ḥadith. The use of words well-known is highly significant here because it suggests that the well-known Sunnah was still conceptually different from Ḥadith and was used as a methodological tool, along with the Qurʾān, to divorce Sunnah from Ḥadith. Having examined the use of Ḥadith in Malik’s Muwatta, al-Shaibani’s Kitab al-Siyar and writings of Awzaʾi Rahman makes an important conclusion in saying that: Awzaʾi regards the Ḥadith of the Prophet as being endowed with fundamental obligatoriness but the Sunnah or the living practice is of same importance to him. His appeals to the practice of the Community or its leaders are to judge from the extinct materials, the most regular feature of his legal argumentation. Malik adduces Ḥadith (not necessarily Prophetic Ḥadith) to vindicate the Medinise Sunnah but regards Sunnah in terms of actual importance, as being superior to the Ḥadith. As for Abu Yusuf and Shaybani, very few of whose legal Ḥadith go back to the Prophet at all, they interpret the Ḥadith with [a] freedom . . . The Iraqi school recognize the supreme importance of Ḥadith but the Ḥadith, according to it, must be situationally interpreted in order that law may be deduced from it.

Sadeghi makes a similar assertion by asserting that “for Abu Ḥanifa and Al-Shaybani not only were the Ḥadith not a primary source of law in practice but that they were also possibly not always binding in theory either.”

The importance given to what can be termed situational interpretation of Ḥadith in the light of the Qurʾān and well-known Sunnah was due to the formulation and projection of many theologico-politically sectarian and moralo-legal Ḥadith to that on to the Prophet himself that were taking place at the time. Many of these reports found their way into the Sahih Ḥadith books such as those complied by Bukhari (d. 256 AD) and Muslim (d. 261 AH). Also it is at this time that Musnād Ḥadith books came into existence. Musnād books contain Ḥadith which have uninterrupted chains of transmission up to the level of the Companions and are ordered according to the Companions’ names. As such, they were not collected with an aim of being used as tools for jurisprudentic purposes, as in the case of Bukhari and Muslim.

As we have seen from the above, this methodology of non-literal interpretation and conceptual differentiation of Sunnah and Ḥadith was still evident throughout most of the second century. Rather than accepting Ḥadith, even ‘authentic Ḥadith’, in an a priori fashion, the concept of assunnah al-maʾrufa was used, as a filter to distinguish between Ḥadith, which could potentially embody Sunnah, and those, which did not.

With regard to the development of isnād, it is during the third decade of the second century that birth of the ‘classical’ sciences of criticism of informants (rijal) started. In additional, it should be pointed out that the bulk of Ḥadith put into wider circulation took place at the level of Successors’ Successors early during the second century and, according to Juynboll, no foolproof method in terms of discerning authentic from inauthentic Ḥadith at the isnād level of Companions can be developed since the majority of Companions died prior to isnād science being systematically used and because of the fact that Companions cannot be considered responsible for their being included in isnāds.

taken from this academic article ( free PDF).

Sunday, February 10, 2019

Ḥadith at the Time of Successors and Early Successors: Successors up until 130 AH

The previous discussion led us to conclude that most of the Companions and early Successors had died before the importance of ‘standardised Ḥadith’ came into being and that ʿamal and oral-based Sunnah still
enjoyed more credence than Ḥadith. The end of the first and beginning of the second century saw a significant growth of Ḥadith as a result of the talab ul-ʿilm/rihla phenomenon so that Ḥadith acquired more currency.
As argued elsewhere, two broad mechanisms were responsible for this development. Firstly, the general perception among some influential and reputable Successors that the expanding Muslim empire would become organically detached from the Qurʾānic and Sunnahic teachings was becoming widespread. Secondly, a change in political fortunes and subsequent rise of the Abbasid dynasty (132 AH), which used the argument of being custodians of the Prophet’s Sunnah through his uncle’s cousin Abbas
to justify and legitimise their political power, along with partisan tensions that emerged within the nascent Muslim community fighting for religious legitimacy, created an ever greater impetus for a more systematic collection of, and searching for, Sunnah in any form. These two trends resulted firstly in the practice-based Sunnah being increasingly clad in the mantle of written-based Sunnah, and secondly in the development of more stringent mechanisms to establish its authenticity of written—especially in terms of the mode of its transmission, i.e. ʿulum-ul-isnād.

At this time, the largely regional character of the Ḥadith body of literature, due to increased inter-regional contact, now became ‘mixed’, that is, it consisted of local/regional and inter-regional Ḥadith. It is at this point
in time that the scattered Ḥadith were now increasingly gathered together and compiled into books. Modes of Ḥadith transmission, apart from those already in operation, included munawalah (handing book to a student without samāʿa or qirāʾa), ijazah (giving permission to teach Ḥadith contained in a book) and wasīyah (entrusting a book for transmission).

Nonetheless, while the importance of Ḥadith was slowly gaining more ground, the transmission, compilation and normalization of Ḥadith was still not widespread at this point in time. For example, the first public
statement containing a prophetic Ḥadith (without an isnād) for governmental purposes was only instituted at the time of Caliph Al-Mahdi in the year 159 AH/776 CE.1 Moreover, Motzki argues in the context of the role and importance of Ḥadith as sources of legal doctrine in Mecca during the period under examination that: “Propheten-aḥādīth spielten als Rechtsquellen nur eine bescheidene Rolle”(The hadith of the prophet played a very modest role as sources of Islamic law)   Furthermore, most of the Ḥadith during this period were still going back to the Companions and Successors rather than to the Prophet himself and had incomplete chains of transmission.

Whilst it is difficult to accurately generalise the usage of isnād in all major centres of learning, the following assertion by Motzki made in the context of the status of isnād usage in the Meccan School of jurisprudence during the first two centuries of Hijrah is likely to be indicative of the level of isnād development in general:

. . . im 1. Jahrhundert [war]die Angabe eines isnād ehe Ausnahme als die Regel [und]
dass sich seit dem Begin des 2. Jahrhunderts aber der Gebrauch des isnād mehr und
mehr durchsetzte. Das ist nur als eine Tendenz zu verstehen.

( During the first century Hijri the use of the isnad was an exception rather than a rule and that since the beginning of the 2nd century Hijri the use of isnad become increasingly prevalent. But this is to be understood as a general trend only)

Mathnee, in the context of critiquing Rahman’s living Sunnah that extended right up to the Shafiʾī period, considers this living Sunnah to have been used in an arbitrary fashion without reference to a particular authority and that it was susceptible to continuous change. He maintains furthermore that the
Sunnah could refer either to a practice or tradition or combination of both and with multiple equivalent authorities.

taken from this article ( free PDF)

Friday, February 1, 2019

Ḥadith at the Time of the Companions and Earliest Successors-Nature,Extent and Importance


With the death of the Prophet, Ḥadith attained a semi-formal status.69 The main purpose of Ḥadith, as mode of Sunnahic transmission, was, according to Rahman, for practical reasons “as something, which could be generated and be elaborated into the practice of the community”.70 Its random writing down marked the development of Ḥadith during this period of time in simple notebooks usually referred to as saḥ ̣īfa/suḥ ̣uf. 71 Nonetheless, judging by their own involvement in making decisions based upon them, the importance given to Ḥadith at the time of the Caliphs was not great. Juynboll asserts that:

 It is safe to say that Abu Bakr, the first caliph, cannot be identified with Ḥadith in any extensive way. This may show that during his reign examples set by the prophet or his followers did not play a decisive role in Abu Bakr’s decision making. With regards to second Caliph’s [Umar] use of word Sunnah ‘the term is usually use to mean: the normative behaviour of a good Muslim in the widest sense of the word’ [rather than a Ḥadith].72


In case of the Uthman’s [third Caliph] view of Ḥadith in conducting of community’s affairs Uthman seems to have relied solely on his judgement.73 From all the different sources74 on which the juristic decisions of Ibn Abbas’s (d. 68) disciples such as Ata b. Abi Rabah were based, only a small number of Prophetic Ḥadith were used.75 By the same token, the importance given to Ḥadith during the entire period of the Umayyad Caliphate (ending in 132 AH/750 CE) was ‘a marginal phenomenon’.76 The early religious epistles77 studied by Van Ess78 and Cook,79 suggest that the term Sunnah “has nothing to do with Ḥadith” and that in them Ḥadith are rarely, if at all, cited but that this “lack of Ḥadith did not betray any hostility towards the notion of Sunnah”.80 Again, these statements must be understood in the context that the understanding of the word Sunnah at that time, as we demonstrated earlier, was ethico-religious in nature,81 permitting a large scope for exercising of one’s own judgement so that Ḥadith was “interpreted by the rulers [of that time] and the judges freely according to the situation at hand.”82


An indication that practice-based, non-written Sunnah was considered superior to that of Ḥadith is found in the chapter of Iyad’s book entitled On What Has Been Related from the First Community and the Men of Knowledge Regarding the obligation of Going Back to the Practice (ʿamal) of the People of Medina, and Its Being a Conclusive Proof (hujja) in Their Opinion, even if it is Contrary to Ḥadith (al-athar).”83

Elsewhere Iyad notes that Umar Ibn al-Khattab [second caliph] once said on the mimbar (pulpit), “By Allah, I will make things difficult for any man who relates a Ḥadith which is contrary to ʿamal.”84 Another factor which leads us to conclude that Ḥadith literature did not enjoy a great deal of importance in legal matters, and that it was quite restricted in scope in the first century, is the fact that the nature of legal literature from that period deals overwhelmingly with issues that the Qurʾān addresses directly such as inheritance, marriage and divorce, injury and compensation, rather than those aspects of the Prophet’s life that were not directly alluded to by the Qurʾān.85 J. van Ess’ examination of first century Muslim literature led him to conclude that the use of Ḥadith and their importance in these works was practically non-existent.86

The earliest indications that Ḥadith literature was spreading are the stories about the faḍāʾil (merit) of the Companions which are likely to have originated during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, that is during the first two years after the Prophet’s death giving rise to what can be termed as politically motivated Sunnah.87 Another genre of early Ḥadith literature is the awāʾil/anecdotes of the qusṣ ās ̣ (preachers) originating at about 40 AH.88 The subject matter of these Ḥadith/stories predominantly dealt with edification of the Prophet and the first generation Muslims termed tarhīb wa targhīb. Another early genre of written literature to emerge was that of rudimentary tafsīr which was, however, not recorded during the Prophet’s time.89 The ḥalāl–ḥarām genre of Ḥadith (i.e. those which have a legal value) “must have been extremely limited in scope and were mainly the products of individual judgement on the part of the first legal minds Islam produced.”90

In terms of isnād development, the second element in the ‘authentic Ḥadith’ equation, is only towards the end of the period under examination (70 AH) that the first consistent usage of isnād was put into practice.91 Modes of transmission were both oral and written in nature and included reading from a Ḥadith book by a teacher to students (samāʿa), reading by students from books to teachers (ʿard/qirāʾa) and written correspondence (wasīyah).92 Towards the end of this period, coinciding with the establishment of regional schools of thought and regional Sunnah, most of the Ḥadith were regional in character, having regional isnāds based on the Companion’s interpretation of Prophetic Sunnah.93 The isnād of Ḥadith stopped at the level of the Companions (or Successors) supporting the broader principle of the schools’ general concept that Companions were in the best position to internalise and be living proponents of Prophetic Sunnah.94 This was reflected in their overall Sunnahic hermeneutic we referred to elsewhere as as-sunnah al-maʾrufa and/or regional Sunnah.95

taken from this academic journal article ( free PDF)

Wednesday, January 23, 2019

Islamic feminism, Patriarchy and Qur’an: A Brief Outline of Current Debates


The viability of the concept of Islamic feminism has an element of  contestedness in terms of its compatibility with the Islamic tradition and its fountainheads. One central component of the possibility of Islamic feminism pertains to the idea of whether or not Islam’s primary source of normative teachings, the Qur’an (or more precisely the nature of Qur’anic revelation) can be reconciled with the modern ideas and concepts that come under the umbrella of feminism/gender equality/ anti-patriarchy. In this section, we outline the most recent debates surrounding this question between what can be termed ‘radical’Muslim feminists and Muslim ‘feminists’.
  
A recent overview of the literature, on theorizing about Islamic feminism, written primarily by Muslim women in the non-Islamicate context, suggests that “a carefully articulated and tentative convergence of the two (i.e. Islam and feminism) intellectual traditions” is both possible and potentially beneficial because such a convergence has “the potential to advance Muslim women’s struggles for equality.”[1] However, this view is contested by a number of contemporary Muslim radical feminist scholars such as  Ali, Chaudhry[2] and Hidayatullah[3] whose works have highlighted, if not re-affirmed,[4] the difficulties and ‘feminist impasses” in espousing gender egalitarian and/or feminist interpretations of Islam in general  and the Qurʾān in particular.
Hidayatullah, following in the footsteps of Ali,[5] critically examined the central presuppositions upon which feminist interpretation of the Qurʾān advocating gender equality was based in the 1990s and 2000s. Reflecting on her book she concludes as follows:

 In the process of writing my book, I came to the difficult conclusion that the contemporary expectations for gender equality at the heart of the feminist exegetical project perhaps cannot ultimately be reconciled with the Qurʾānic text. A claim to the contrary is often based on distortions of the text and anachronistic positions.[6]

The reasons for this diagnosis is that despite the existence of what she terms ‘mutuality verses’ ( e.g. 4:1; 30:21; 9:71; 33:35) which  are agreeable to our contemporary understandings of gender justice there exist in the Qurʾān  ‘hierarchy verses’ ( such as  2:223; 2:228; 4:34)  that “ endorse male  control over women and presume hierarchical male-female relations”[7] and hence perhaps present an insurmountable obstacle for the project of Islamic feminism/ gender egaliterianism. Hidayatullah considers that the manner in which the Muslim feminist interpreters have hermeneutically attempted to deal with these hierarchy verses on basis of various hermeneutical principles[8], in end effect, amount to nothing more than apologetics. Hidayatullah also argues that we must accept the ‘hierarchy verses’ as “real elements”[9] of the Qurʾān and come to terms with what this means for the Qurʾānic feminist project. Hence, she concludes that the Muslim feminist attempts to find support for gender equality in the Qurʾān  have been inadequate (since these inequalities are ontological rather than functional) and have resulted in kind of ‘text fundamentalism’ which ascribes to text the meaning that the text itself. This ‘text fundamentalism’ adds Hidayatullah is also contradictory to the kind of hermeneutics the Muslim feminist theologians subscribe to in the first place. As a result, Hidayatullah opines that the manner in which Muslim feminists have interpreted the text has marginalized the importance of extra-textual hermeneutical principles in their overall hermeneutical models which in actual fact hold a better promise for their ultimate aim.[10]

The work of Hidayatullah has sparked a robust debate between radical feminists and feminists. The latter include scholars such as Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas, whose views are criticised by Hidayatullah. These scholars argue that the Qur’an is not inherently a patriarchal text and that it can sustain women emancipatory/women inclusive readings /interpretations and consider it their aim to restore the Qur’anic basis of sexual equality in Islam by freeing the Qur’an from the patriarchal nature of its classical, some modern exegesis and the scepticism of radical Muslim feminists. In the words of Barlas:

Azizah al-Hibri, Riffat Hassan, amina wadud, and I had sought to recuperate teachings that affirm the ontological and moral/ethical equality of women and men. Our intent was to show that the Qur an’s position on women cannot be delimited to the “anti-women” verses, which we had also reread as a way to illustrate that meaning is contingent on our own interpretive methods and choices… wadud and I had made two points about the Qur an and patriarchy. She had argued that it “remains neutral” toward patriarchy,[11] whereas I held that its rejections of the patriarchal imaginary of God as father/male, and the fact that it makes no mention of sex or gender inequalities, signal an antipatriarchal episteme.[12]

Barlas goes on to explain how her efforts (and that of wadud), have been, in Barlas’ view unjustifiably/unreasonably/erroneously problematized as “dishonest”[13] and “manipulating” the “incurably patriarchal” Qur’anic texts by radical Muslim feminists.[14] Furthermore, Barlas argues that her critics are not only “disinterested in a liberatory hermeneutics of the Qur’an but some also now question its sacrality and want Muslims to stop treating it as a sacred text that has a sanctified relationship to God.”[15] She describes such as intellectual attitude as  “anti-theological, anti-hermeneutical, and anti-women.” Ultimately, Barlas argues that, this criticism of her liberatory hermeneutics is misleading for it not only rejects the possibility of non-patriarchal interpretations but that it privileges, if not conflates, the patriarchal Islamic tradition ( including its patriarchal interpretation of the Qur’an)  with the Qur’an itself.
Wadud , generally agreeing with Barlas’ comments above,  considers the ‘feminist critique” of Hidayatullah and Ali as  amounting  to not much more than “making patriarchal readings divine”[16] and whose project is summed by the view that  “ either we liberate women from every utterance in the Qur’an or we throw out the sacred aspect of the text altogether.”[17] Wadud goes on to argue that such an approach misses an important point namely that  “As soon as we acknowledge that none can know fully what Allah meant, then the door is open to both patriarchal and feminist egalitarian readings.” Furthermore, wadud maintains that interpreters of the Qur’an need

 to maintain both a critical response to and a faithful reverence within the tension of the simultaneity. This is where the text’s sublime ambiguity becomes the primary
means for liberation from literal readings of certain passages—to instead read
through the texts, to its context and back again to its pretext, in order to help
reveal how it might best be applied to our contexts.[18]

Hidayatullah has responded to this critique by arguing that it is not her perspective that
“the Qur’an is an intractably patriarchal text” but that there is a kind of methodological impass between patriarchal and non-patriarchal interpretations of the Qur’an and that
she remains “ unconvinced that we can find clear support in the text itself for privileging either set of meanings over the other”.[19] To Hidayatullah this implies that it is not possible to “definitely establish” the idea or that she is “radically uncertain” that the Qur’anic text can “cohere with contemporary values of male-female equality” as the works of scholars like Barlas suggest. Affirming that, as a Muslim, she shares with  scholars such as Barlas and wadud the premise that the God of the Qur’an is Just  and the Qur’an is the sacred revelation of God , for Hidayatullah’ the fundamental question of (non)-patriarchal nature of the Qur’an (or the God of the Qur’an) is theological and not  a hermeneutical one. This leads her to the idea that the differences between her views and that of those whom she critiques ultimately lie at the level of how they respectively understand the very nature of the concept of sacred revelation and what makes it so.[20]
K. Ali’s views concur with Hidayatullah’s overall assessment sketched above. In this context Ali argues that what she terms “pro-woman, pro-justice, or gender-egalitarian interpretations of the Qur’an’” such as those of Barlas ultimately not only “fail to confront squarely the difficulties inherent in interpreting” verses that assert or accept male dominance but also do not provide satisfactory account at the theological level, about the very existence of such verses in the Qur’an. As such Ali is of the view that the scholarship of scholars such as Barlas exaggerates Qur’an’s supposed egalitarian and anti-patriarchal credentials even if it can sustain such interpretations.

The above outline provides us with the general insight into the nature of disagreements pertaining to the hermeneutical and theological possibilities of Islamic feminism.



[1] See Fatima Seedat, “When Islam and Feminism Converge,” Muslim World 103, (3, 2013): 404-420.
[2] Ayesha S.Chaudhry, Domestic Violence and the Islamic tradition: Ethics, Law and the Muslim Discourse on Gender ( Oxford University Press,2014).
[3] Aysha A. Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qurʾān  (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
[4] Kecia Ali, Sexual Ethics in Islam: Feminist reflections on Qurʾān , adīth, and jurisprudence
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006).
[5] Ibid.
[6] Aysha A. Hidayatullah, “Feminist Interpretation of the Qurʾān  in a Comparative Feminist Setting”, Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion, 30 (Fall 2014) : 115-129, 117-118.
[7] Ibid,p.118.
[8] Such as prioritization of ‘mutuality’  over hierarchy verses , the idea that the alleged dissonance between the two types of verses is a product of our own contemporary egalitarian ethics rather something inherent to the Qurʾān  and  the idea of moral trajectories in the text which are nothing else than the   projection of contemporary gender ideals into the Qurʾān ic text. Ibid,p.119-120.
[9] Ibid,p.120.
[10] Ibid,p.121-122.
[11] Amina Wadud, Qur an and Woman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9.
[12] Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 32.2 (2016), 111–121,111.
[13] i.e. in applying modern concepts such as gender egalitarianism to premodern, non-gender egalitarian text of the Qur’an)  
[14] Ayesha Hidayatullah, Feminist Edges of the Qur an (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), xx., 142
[15] Ibid,p.112.
[16] Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 32.2 (2016), 130–134,130.
[17] Ibid,p.132.
[18] P,132.
[19] Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 32.2 (2016), 134–138, p.135-136
[20] Ibid,137.