The Premodern Interpretational Approaches to Ethics and Reason in Qur’an and Its Interpretational Implications

 Does the Qur’an advocate ethical subjectivism,  ethical objectivism,  or

ethical voluntarism ? In other words does the Qur’an assume that what

is right can always be known by revelation- independent reason  alone  ;

what is right can be known in some cases by revelation- independent reason

alone and in others by revelation and revelation- derived sources whereby

both of these sources are complementary and in agreement, or in order

to know what is right, humans must always rely only on revelation and

revelation- derived sources and can never know what is right by independent

reason. 

This leads us into the widely discussed theme in Islamic tradition of

the nature of the relationship between reason and revelation (whose exact

relationship is yet to be systematically arrived at. 

Elsewhere I demonstrated that the legitimacy and the place

of reason in conceptualizing the nature and the interpretation of Qur’an

and Sunna during the first three to four generations of Muslims was much

broader and reason inclusive than in postformative Islamic thought. I

argued that it was only in the middle of the second century of the Islamic

calendar that the epistemological- methodological framework behind the

concept of the nature of the relationship between reason and revelation

and revelation derived- sources started to initiate the mechanisms that ultimately

resulted in introducing a qualitative change to the reason- revelation

dynamic. This change completely subordinated ontologically, epistemologically,

and methodologically the scope and the legitimacy of reason and

reason- derived opinion ( ra’y ) to that of the textually based sources of revelation,

i.e., Qur’an and Hadith. With this process in completion by the

middle of the third century of the Islamic calendar, reason was primarily

used in a derivative sense to assist in arriving at the consensus of opinions

( ijma’ ) of the Muslim Community or in its analogical ( qiyas ) function.

The above described tendency toward ahistorical, decontextualized,

and philologically oriented manahij to Qur’anic interpretation was based

upon a particular concept of the nature of the primary sources of Islamic Weltanschauung . Once Sunna was conceptually equated with Hadith and

made epistemologically and methodologically dependent upon canonical

hadith compendia and the hadith- based hermeneutic of the Qur’an was

elevated to the highest ranks of the interpretational endeavor, the role of

reason in the overall Qur’anic hermeneutic was relegated to the background.

The reason- based interpretation had now to function within the boundaries

of the entirely textually based interpretational framework. This narrowing

of the interpretational scope of reason was hermeneutically incapable

of going beyond the text and searching for the possible moral trajectories,

rationale, and objectives ( maqasid ) of the Qur’anic revelation. 

 Furthermore this manhaj permitted only a derivative use of reason in

the form of an analogy ( qiyas ), which was epistemologically and methodologically

embedded firmly in the normative textual indicants. The

role of reason, thus, was seen as strictly instrumental. The Divine Will,

as embodied in the normative texts, was considered by the majority of

legal philosophers as the sole determinant in the realm of law and “no

concept of human reason as [being] author of ultimate source of law”

was developed.  Indeed, in the context of characterizing classical Islamic

law, argues Weiss, that “between human reason and the law of God there

stretched an essentially unbridgeable gap.”  Weiss terms this hermeneutical

tendency in premodern manahij as voluntarism . It permeated the way

in which nature of law, ethics, morality, and ontology was conceptualized.

A subscription to voluntarism has important interpretational implications.

Firstly, it affects the way in which the nature and the character of

Qur’anic revelation is perceived and interpreted. Voluntarism was responsible

for infusing the Revelation with a comprehensive legalistic ethos and

subsequent marginalization of some of its other dimensions such as those

that could be broadly termed ethicoreligious in nature. This distorted the

way in which the overall nature, character, and “purpose” of the Qur’anic

Revelation and its message were perceived and subsequently conceptualized.

Voluntarism also implies a legalistic expression of the Will of God

that can only be known from commands and prohibitions. This approach

renders the law entirely dependent upon a sovereign and unbound divine

will that denies any rational element in it as well as views humanity as not

being capable of comprehending independently of the help of revelation. 

An interpretational model premised on voluntarism also assumes that the

text includes the complete knowledge and that the role of reason in interpretation

of the text is minimal. All four Sunni premodern major schools of

jurisprudence and theology adopted in various degrees a “voluntarist” view

of the relationship between reason and revelation. As argued in the second

chapter NTS school of thought went further by even disputing the legitimacy

of analogical reason in any branches pertaining to ‘ilm may that be in usul- ul- fiqh or theology.

This voluntaristic hermeneutic, as espoused by the most widespread theology of Sunni Asha’rism,

is ultimately responsible for the subversion of rational ethics and authority

in Islamic law and ethics according to which “an act can be gauged as

good from a certain perspective and detestable from another,”  and “both

analysis would be in accordance with the sovereign will of God.”  Al Attar

describes this view of ethics and morality as being based on a “Divine

Command Theory,” which presupposes that “divine commands and rules

have to be obeyed regardless of the social or moral implications, as there is

no rationale beyond their being divine commands.” 

Taken from Chapter 3 of this book ( free PDF).