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The Urgent Need for a Robust and Nuanced Definition of Islamophobia (and Antisemitism) : Crucial Steps Towards Understanding and Combating Prejudice

 


 

Adis Duderija

 (Associate Professor, Griffith University

The terms Islamophobia and antisemitism have become increasingly prevalent in public discourse, yet their meanings remain contested and often misunderstood. This ambiguity hinders efforts to address the real harms they inflict on individuals and communities. A robust definition of both Islamophobia and antisemitism are not merely academic exercises; they are essential tools for identifying, challenging, and ultimately eradicating prejudice and discrimination against Muslims and Jewish people respectively. Given my expertise in this article I focus on islamophobia but draw some  hopefully useful parallels with regards to definition of antisemitism.  Furthermore, I argue that having clear criteria for legitimate criticism of Islam, as proposed by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI), is crucial in navigating the complex landscape of religious discourse and preventing the weaponisation of criticism to mask bigotry.

As discussed in my co-authored book , the concept of Islamophobia emerged as a significant issue in the late 1990s, gaining traction throughout the 2000s, with the Runnymede Trust Report of 1997 playing a pivotal role in its conceptualisation. The Runnymede Trust defined Islamophobia as “an outlook or world-view involving an unfounded dread and dislike of Muslims, which results in practices of exclusion and discrimination”. This definition underscores that Islamophobia is not simply a matter of personal bias or isolated incidents, but a systemic issue with tangible consequences.

A major challenge in defining Islamophobia lies in determining the target of the prejudice: is it directed at Islam as a religion, or at Muslims as individuals, or perhaps both?. This distinction is important because it speaks to the nature of the prejudice. When the focus is on Islamic teachings, it can be argued that criticism is directed at ideas. However, when the focus is on Muslims as people, it moves into the realm of discrimination and exclusion. Moreover, the issue of distinguishing Islamophobia from other forms of discrimination like racism and xenophobia further complicates the matter.

The diverse manifestations of Islamophobia highlight its multifaceted nature. In my co-authored book I identify  four key forms of manifestation:

  • Social exclusion, such as marginalization from politics, employment, and positions of responsibility.
  • Violence, including physical assaults, property damage, and verbal abuse.
  • Prejudice, which manifests in media portrayals and everyday conversations.
  • Discrimination, such as unequal treatment in employment and access to services.

These forms of manifestation are interconnected. For example, prejudiced media portrayals can fuel discriminatory practices and violence. It is important to note that these manifestations of Islamophobia have been well-documented in various reports across the globe, such as in Europe, America, and Australia, highlighting its global reach and impact.

In the book mentioned above several causes for the rise of Islamophobia over the last three decades or so have been identified. These include:

  • The rise in Muslim immigration to the West.
  • The rise of Islamism and the ‘War on Terror’.
  • Islamist terrorist attacks in the West.
  • The role of mass media and especially social media.
  • The racialization of religion, where anti-Arab and anti-Asian sentiments have shifted towards anti-Muslim sentiment.

In this sense, Islamophobia can be seen as a form of racism, where both biology and culture are factors. As it is pointed out in the book, during the Holocaust and the Bosnian genocide, simply not engaging in religious practices would not save individuals targeted based on their religious identity. It was the community and population that they were targeting. This highlights the social and political construction of race as a means of discrimination. Similarly, during the Holocaust, the targeting of Jewish people was not solely based on their religious practices but on their identity as a population. This mirrors the way Muslims are targeted based on their identity rather than their religious practices, highlighting that both antisemitism and Islamophobia can be seen as forms of racism where both biological and cultural factors are used to discriminate against certain groups.

It is essential to recognize that criticism of Islam is distinct from Islamophobia. There must be room for critical approaches to the  Islamic tradition ( and I have been for two decades a strong proponent of  this when it comes to Islamic fundamentalism) , as with any other set of beliefs and ideas, and there should be a right to critique ideas, but it is essential that criticism is not a mask for intolerance and bigotry. This brings us to the criteria for legitimate criticism, as laid out by the Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (CBMI).

The CBMI Criteria for Legitimate Criticism: A Framework for Constructive Engagement

The CBMI criteria provide a valuable framework for distinguishing between legitimate criticism of Islam and Islamophobic discourse. These criteria address key dimensions that help to assess the nature and intent behind the critique. These dimensions are organized into eight key areas:

  • Monolithic vs. Diverse: Legitimate criticism acknowledges the diversity of thought and practice within Islam, avoiding generalizations. Islamophobia, on the other hand, often portrays Islam as monolithic and static.
  • Other vs. Interdependent: Legitimate critique recognizes that Islam is part of a complex, interconnected world, whereas Islamophobia often portrays Islam as separate, ‘other’ and irreconcilable with Western societies.
  • Inferior vs. Different but Equal: Legitimate criticism considers different cultures equal and different. Islamophobia on the other hand positions Islam as inferior to other cultures and religions.
  • Aggressive Enemy vs. Cooperative Partner: Legitimate criticism acknowledges that some elements of some Islamic traditions may be problematic while still recognising that Muslims as a community are generally peaceful. Islamophobia paints Islam and Muslims as fundamentally aggressive and an enemy.
  • Manipulative vs. Sincere: Legitimate criticism acknowledges that some people use any religious tradition for personal and political gains, but it is important not to assume that all adherents are dishonest. Islamophobia assumes that all Muslims are manipulative or insincere in their beliefs and practices.
  • Rejection vs. Debate of Muslim Criticisms: Legitimate criticism must be open to engaging with and debating Muslim criticisms of Western societies. Islamophobia often dismisses Muslim voices.
  • Defense vs. Opposition of Discrimination: Legitimate criticism would oppose all forms of discrimination including those directed at Muslims. Islamophobia defends or ignores discriminatory behaviour against Muslims.
  • Natural vs. Problematic Anti-Muslim Discourse: Legitimate criticism recognises that criticism of ideas is one thing, but anti-Muslim hate speech is a problem. Islamophobia normalizes and promotes anti-Muslim discourse.

These criteria are crucial in  understanding what constitutes Islamophobia and what does not. For example, while criticizing specific Islamic doctrines is valid, using such critiques to stereotype all Muslims as violent or fanatical crosses the line into Islamophobia. Similarly, while a discussion of the role of religion in politics is important, denying the basic human  rights of Muslims is clearly Islamophobic.

The above outlined CBMI criteria offer an important framework to help differentiate between fair critique and prejudiced bigotry. Just as a clear definition of Islamophobia and criteria for legitimate criticism of Islam are crucial for combating prejudice against Muslims, a similar effort is required to establish a robust and well-understood definition of antisemitism, along with an understanding of what constitutes legitimate criticism of Judaism, in order to combat antisemitism effectively. One such definition/declaration does exist, namely the Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism.

The Importance of Clarity and Action

A clear definition of Islamophobia and antisemitism, along with adherence to the CBMI criteria, is not just an abstract academic concern but a practical necessity. Without a robust definition, it is difficult to identify and counter Islamophobic and antisemitic acts and rhetoric. When Islamophobia is not recognized, its consequences can be dire, as evidenced by the tragic events in Christchurch.

In this regard, it is imperative that we work with media outlets to ensure responsible reporting on Islam and Muslims, develop counter-narratives to challenge Islamophobic stereotypes and tropes while simultaneously critiquing harmful interpretations of Islam that contribute to anti-Muslim sentiment, and promote initiatives that foster interfaith dialogue and understanding. Social media companies need to do more to moderate hate speech online, including monitoring and removing hate speech and harmful content ( I attempted to draw attention to Youtube one of the videos of a popular preacher Assim Al Hakeem in which  he intimates that non-Muslim should be killed if they do not pay the “humility” tax for not converting to Islam to be taken down but without success) .

In conclusion, defining Islamophobia (and antisemitism) and establishing robust and nuanced criteria for legitimate criticism are essential steps in combating prejudice and discrimination against Muslims and Jewish people alike. A robust definition of Islamophobia and antisemitism allows us to recognize the various forms they take, from social exclusion and discrimination to violence and hate speech. The CBMI criteria, meanwhile, provide a useful yardstick to evaluate critique of Islam, differentiating between fair criticism and discriminatory, bigoted rhetoric. By combining this clarity with concrete action, we can begin to address the root causes of Islamophobia and antisemitism and build more inclusive and equitable societies for all.

 

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