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Professor Dupré's Process Ontology and Free Will: A Theological Exploration

 


Adis Duderija 

 

The discourse surrounding free will has long been a focal point of philosophical and theological inquiry. Traditionally, this discussion has been heavily influenced by classical theism and mechanistic views of the universe, which portray reality as a deterministic machine governed by fixed laws. However, Professor Dupré's process ontology introduces a transformative framework that not only redefines our understanding of free will but also challenges the foundational tenets of classical theism. By aligning with process relational theology, Dupré's approach emphasizes the dynamic, relational nature of existence, thereby undermining static notions of divine omnipotence and human agency.

 

The Traditional Framework: Classical Theism and Determinism

 

Classical theism posits a God who is omniscient, omnipotent, and immutable. This conception significantly influences the understanding of human agency and free will. In a deterministic universe, where every event is causally linked to preceding conditions, the notion of free will becomes problematic. Human actions are either seen as the inevitable results of prior causes, stripping individuals of genuine freedom, or as random occurrences that fail to embody true agency.

 

In this traditional view, humans are often considered exceptional cases within a deterministic framework. This perspective aligns with Newtonian physics, which portrays the universe as a vast machine, operating under universal laws that dictate every event. Such a worldview diminishes the complexity of existence and overlooks the emergent properties that characterize human experience. Consequently, the classical theistic understanding of a sovereign, controlling deity further complicates the discourse on free will, as it suggests that divine foreknowledge and predestination may negate human autonomy.

 

Dupré's Process Ontology: A Shift in Perspective

 

Professor Dupré’s process ontology offers a radical departure from these static interpretations of reality. By framing the universe as a landscape of dynamic processes rather than fixed entities, Dupré encourages a reevaluation of the nature of existence and human agency. In this view, order and stability are not inherent characteristics of the universe; rather, they emerge from a chaotic foundation. This perspective aligns with process relational theology, which emphasizes the interconnectedness of all entities and the significance of temporal becoming.

 

Emergent Properties and Causal Powers

 

Dupré argues that processes are the fundamental constituents of reality, possessing their own causal powers that shape the world. This understanding presents humans not as anomalies within a deterministic framework but as complex processes—"the densest concentrations of causal power" in the universe. This reframing challenges the notion of a static God who imposes order upon chaos. Instead, it invites a view of God as engaged in an evolving relationship with creation, where divine influence is understood in terms of persuasion rather than coercion.

 

The implications for free will are profound. Within a process-oriented ontology, human agency is characterized not by deterministic predictability but by the capacity to impose order on chaos. This view highlights the fluidity of existence, suggesting that human actions can emerge from a richly interconnected web of relationships, rather than from a linear chain of cause and effect.

 

Understanding Free Will in a Process Framework

 

Agency as a Spectrum

 

Dupré’s exploration of free will emphasizes the distinction between mechanism and agency. While machines operate on predetermined principles, agents possess goals and the ability to act upon them. This distinction is crucial for understanding the spectrum of agency that exists among living beings. Simple organisms, like bacteria, exhibit minimal agency through survival-driven actions, while humans, with their complex goals and capacities for reflection, demonstrate a significantly higher degree of agency.

 

Dupré argues that human freedom is intimately linked to the ability to act according to second-order desires—long-term goals shaped by principles rather than immediate impulses. This nuanced understanding of agency allows for a more robust conception of free will that acknowledges the multitude of factors influencing individual choices, including upbringing and societal conditions.

 

The Role of Self-Cultivation

 

Despite acknowledging that individual principles and goals are influenced by external factors, Dupré emphasizes the importance of self-cultivation in exercising agency. Through conscious effort, individuals can refine their will and cultivate their character, actively shaping their paths in the world. This notion resonates with theological perspectives that emphasize moral development and the potential for transformation within the human experience.

 

The processual view of free will underscores the importance of intentionality and reflection in human actions. It posits that genuine agency involves the capacity to transcend mere impulse and align actions with overarching values and long-term aspirations. This perspective does not negate the influence of external circumstances but rather highlights the potential for individuals to navigate these challenges through self-awareness and moral discernment.

 

 

The Social Dimension of Freedom

 

Another critical aspect of Dupré's argument is the social dimension of freedom. He contends that individual freedom is contingent upon the existence of a functioning society that provides essential needs, education, and a supportive infrastructure. This assertion has significant theological implications, as it aligns with the notion of communal responsibility found in many religious traditions.

 

The acknowledgment of social inequalities and their impact on individual freedom challenges the classical theistic view of divine providence, which often portrays God's sovereignty as a guarantee of individual autonomy. Dupré’s perspective suggests that a truly just society is essential for the realization of human potential, thereby reframing the relationship between divine action and human agency. In this sense, God can be seen as a collaborator in the ongoing process of social justice, prompting humanity toward greater equity and freedom.

 

Theological Implications: Undermining Classical Theism

 

Dupré's process ontology and its implications for free will present a direct challenge to classical theism. By emphasizing the dynamic, relational nature of existence, this approach undermines the traditional view of an immutable God who predetermines human actions. Instead, it invites a reimagining of the divine as a participant in the unfolding processes of creation, characterized by persuasion rather than coercion.

 

God as Process and Relationality

 

In process relational theology, God is not an external observer but an integral participant in the process of becoming. This view aligns with Dupré's assertion that reality is fundamentally relational, where every entity is interconnected and continuously influencing one another. Such a perspective resonates with the theological notion of Imago Dei, suggesting that humanity reflects God's relational nature through its capacity for agency and moral choice.

 

Furthermore, this understanding of God challenges the static notions of divine omnipotence and omniscience that characterize classical theism. Instead of viewing God as an all-controlling force, process theology posits a God who experiences the world alongside creation, responding to the evolving complexities of existence. This conception redefines divine sovereignty, emphasizing the importance of mutual influence and cooperation between the divine and human realms.

 

Conclusion

 

Professor Dupré's process ontology offers a transformative framework for understanding free will that resonates deeply with theological dimensions, particularly within the context of process relational theology. By challenging the deterministic assumptions of classical theism, Dupré invites a re-evaluation of human agency as an emergent property arising from the dynamic interplay of relationships. This perspective not only enriches the discourse on free will but also emphasizes the importance of self-cultivation and social justice in fostering genuine freedom.

 

In a world increasingly characterised by complexity and interdependence, Dupré’s insights encourage a more nuanced understanding of both divine action and human agency. As we grapple with the theological implications of a process-oriented worldview, we are reminded that freedom is not merely an individual pursuit but a collective endeavour, deeply rooted in the relational fabric of existence. In this light, the journey towards greater agency and freedom becomes a shared responsibility, reflecting the divine call to cultivate a more just and equitable society.

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