Friday, February 25, 2022

Renewal of Islamic Law and Maqāṣid sharīʿa in the Thought of Mohammad Hashim Kamali

 

 

Renewal of Islamic Law and Maqāṣid sharīʿa in the Thought of Mohammad Hashim Kamali

 adopted from this publication-chapter one

Mohammad Hashim Kamali( b.1944) is one of the leading contemporary scholars writing on the concept of renewal (tajdīd) of Muslim thought and  maqāṣid sharīʿa   for over four decades. In this lecture Dr.Duderija aims to present some of Professor Kamali’s ideas on renewal of Islamic law with the specific emphasis on the role of maqāṣid sharīʿa  in this respect. In the first part, Dr.Duderija discusses the concept of tajdid hadari as understood by Kamali. The second part of the lecture Dr. Duderija outlines various avenues and methods Kamali uses in his writing on renewal of Islamic law with the emphasises on the nature of the shari’a, Qur'an, sunna and the role of reason in Islamic law and ethics. In the final part Dr.Duderija presents Kamali’s views on tajdid oriented maqasid al sharia.

 

Brief Biographical Note

Mohammed Hashim Kamali was born on February 7, 1944, in Lalpur, Nangarhar, Afghanistan. He received his bachelor’s degree in law and political science from Kabul University in 1965 and his master’s degree in law (comparative law) and his doctorate from the University of London in 1972 and 1976, respectively. Most of his teaching career has been spent at McGill (Montreal, Canada) and the International Islamic University (Kuala Lumpur) where he was teaching and researching issues pertaining to Islamic law. He is a prolific scholar and one of the world leading authorities on Islamic law. Moreover, Professor Kamali has been very active in a number of committees and has chaired several of organizations. He is the founding chairperson and CEO of the International Institute of Advanced Islamic Studies, Malaysia, and editor-in-chief of its journal, Islam and Civilisational Renewal, that began with publication in 2008.

Nature of Islamic Law Renewal: Tajdīd Haḍari

Kamali has been advocating for renewal in Islamic thought and in Islamic law and legal theory, in particular, for well over three decades.

 The idea of tajdīd haari is often employed by Kamali in the context of defining and discussing another major concept in his thought, namely, Islam haari, or civilizational Islam, I am interested in discussing the Islam haari concept only insofar as it is useful for us to understand the nature of tajdīd as a means of Islamic law renewal in Kamali’s thought.

 

In his discussion of the definition, nature, and scope of Islam haḍari, Kamali asserts that the idea of tajdīd, or renewal, is central to it because it is “germane to every aspect of Islam haḍari and is a well-established concept in the Islamic intellectual tradition as we have known it.” Importantly, apart from noticing its value of “authenticity” as a concept that is firmly rooted in the history and the normative sources of Islam, Kamali defines tajdīd as an inherently open and contextual process that, unlike taqlīd and ijtihād, cannot be subject to a predetermined methodology and framework. He argues further that tajdīd is representative of “the need for renewal, interpretation and ijtihād”  especially on issues that do not have a historical precedent in the Islamic tradition. Kamali defends the need for tajdīd not only on the basis of its embeddedness in the Islamic historical experience but also by asserting that Muslim communities have, over time, “lost touch” with the “original impulse and premises of Islam,” which have been diluted or even lost due to “taqlīd, colonialisation, and rampant secularism.”

Significantly, Kamali, in the context of delineating the scope of tajdīd, links this concept with that of maqāṣid. Here he makes a distinction between two types of tajdīd, both of which he considers to be valid and authentic.

The first type of tajdīd can be directly linked to, and is subsumed under, the five essential maqāṣid[BB1]  ( namely, protection of life, protection of property, protection of health, protection of religion, and protection of dignity-) as per classical Islamic legal theory (e.g.Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali d.1111). The second kind of tajdīd does not need to be traced back to the five essential maqāṣid and is valid as long as it does not alter “the immutable norms and principles of Islam,” by which Kamali means the basic beliefs and pillars of Islam. In the case of this second type of tajdīd, Kamali believes that it is not necessary to provide affirmative evidence directly from the Qurʾān and Sunna in order to prove tajdīd’s acceptability since this type of tajdid is aligned with the underlying purposes and objectives of the Qur’an and Sunna.  

 

Finally, Kamali considers tajdīd to be a dynamic process/concept that is both specific and responsive to the prevailing societal circumstances to which it is being applied at any given point in time.  

 

This characterization and definition of tajdīd clearly permits Kamali to widen the scope of renewal that is not bound by the legal methodologies inherited from the past.

The Idea of the Renewal of Islamic Law

Kamali, in his numerous writings, has unequivocally expressed his view of the need for Islamic law renewal for a number of different reasons both internal and external to the religious tradition. In this context he remarks:

The increased isolation of sharīʿa from the realities of law and government in contemporary Muslim societies accentuates the need for fresh efforts to make the sharīʿa a viable proposition and a living force in society. Our problems over taqlīd are exacerbated by the development of a new dimension to taqlīd as a result of Western colonialism which has led to indiscriminate imitation of the laws and institutions of the West. The prevailing legal practice in many Muslim countries, and indeed many of their constitutions, are modeled on a precedent that does not claim its origin in the legal heritage of Islam.

 

Elsewhere he states that the recent Islamic revivalist thought has increased Muslim awareness of the need to renew links with their heritage and find their own solutions to the issues that concern them by returning to the sharīʿa as its most civilizationally distinct and tangible aspect. He emphasizes, however, that these efforts must attempt to relate  sharīʿa

to the living conditions of the people and be relevant to the contemporary

needs and realities of Muslim societies.

According to Kamali, for renewal to take place, this would entail an imaginative reconstruction and ijtihad[BB3]  ( innovative thinking) including revision and modification of the rules of fiqh so as to translate the broad objectives of the sharīʿa into the laws and institutions of contemporary society.

Importantly, the nature of Kamali’s envisaged renewal, apart from its emphasis on authenticity, is conceptualized in very pragmatic and realistic terms. It favors a gradual and realistic approach to legislation and social renewal that is averse to abrupt revolutionary changes. Kamali advocates for a renewal that aims to the fullest extent possible to utilize the legacy of premodern Muslim thought, including Islamic law and legal theory.

 

If this is so, on what grounds does Kamali frame the possibility of this renewal of Islamic law and legal theory in particular?

Avenues and Methods of Renewal

Now I   describe Kamali’s understanding of the nature of and the delineating features of sharīʿa, the Qurʾān, the Sunna, and how the relationship between revelation and reason creates a space for renewing Islamic law.

The first significant element in Kamaliʿs conceptualization of sharīʿa

for renewal purposes is that sharīʿa has certain aims and purposes (maqāid). At the broadest level, these include the realization of people’s welfare (malaa) with regard to their worldly life as well as the hereafter and their protection from corruption and evil. Importantly, Kamali asserts that this description of the aims and purposes of sharīʿa includes its laws both in the sphere of rituals (ʿibādāt) and civil transactions (muʿmalāt). In this context he argues that the overall purpose of the majority of Islamic laws and values, especially those concerning the rituals and morals (akhlāq), is to train the individual to be more God conscious (taqwā) and a better human

being by becoming a beneficial member of the society in which he/she lives.

Significantly, he also emphasizes that the underlying message of Islam is the realization of people’s benefits (malaa), which are closely linked to the purposes and objectives of sharīʿa.

Having stated that in the very concept of sharīʿa certain aims and objectives are inherent, Kamali also refers to the nature of sharī’a  in a particular manner. As a corollary to the argument about the aims or purposes of sharīʿa, he refers to it as being primarily an ethico-religious values-based construct, which is essential to the primary message of Islam, its safeguarding, and its continued future relevance. He argues against the dominant view as espoused by both many (pre)modern Muslim jurists and Western scholars of Islam of the legalistic nature of sharīʿa as forming its core. In this regard he makes an important distinction between the legal and moral aspects of sharīʿa. The legal aspects of shari’a , unlike the moral, are only peripheral to the original message and purpose of shari’a.

 Importantly, Prof.Kamali  argues that the laws of sharīʿa, including the clear texts of the Qurʾān and adīth, must not be isolated from their proper purposes. Significantly, he also makes an assertion that maintaining harmony with the spirit of sharīʿa may at times entail a certain departure from its letter.[BB4] [AD5] 

Making a clear conceptual distinction between sharīʿa and fiqh is another very prominent feature of Kamali’s thinking in relation to the possibility of renewal of Islamic law. He considers sharīʿa to be closely related to and mainly grounded in Revelation (wahy), whose only sources are the Qurʾān and the Sunna. Fiqh is a legal science developed by jurists and is therefore a product of ijtihād, of human reason. Kamali considers sharīʿa, which comprises in its scope not only law but also theology and moral teaching, to be a wider concept than fiqh, which primarily addresses practical legal rules.

 

 For Kamali, the sharīʿa originates in the Qurʾān and it consists of both specific rulings and broad principles of legal and moral import. Kamali argues further that clear and specific injunctions of the Qurʾān and the Sunna constitute the core of the sharīʿa and the understanding that they impart is expected to be self-evident and leaves little room for interpretation.

While sharīʿa provides general directives, the detailed solutions to particular and unprecedented issues are explored by fiqh. Fiqh is therefore an understanding of sharīʿa and not sharīʿa itself. Whereas sharīʿa demarcates the path that the believer has to tread in order to obtain guidance, fiqh means human understanding and knowledge. Fiqh is thus positive law that does not include morality and dogma. It is a “mere superstructure and a practical manifestation of commitment to sharīʿa values.”

By making these distinctions Kamali prepares the ground for the argument that Islamic law as contained in fiqh manuals can be subject to critical scrutiny and criticism that opens up avenues for its renewal.

Another important aspect of Islamic law renewal is based on his understanding of the nature of the relationship between reason and revelation, which according to him is one of complementarity. The following quote encapsulates well Kamali’s thinking on this issue:

 

Revelation expounds the purpose of the creation of man, the basic framework

of his relationship with the creator, and the nature of his role and

mission in this life. Revelation also spells out the broad outline of values

that human reason should follow and promote. Without the aid of revelation

the attempt to provide a basic framework of values is likely to

engage man in perpetual doubt as to the purpose of his own existence

and the nature of his relationship with God and His creation. Revelation thus complements reason and gives it a sense of assurance and purpose which helps prevent it from indulgence in boundless speculation… Islam’s vision of reality, truth, and its moral values of right

and wrong are initially determined by revelation and then elaborated and

developed by reason.

 

This reasoning leads Kamali to the conclusion that there exists a convergence of values between sharīʿa and natural law and of Islam as

din al-fiṭra (the natural religion) with natural values. He emphasizes that

although each moral-legal system has distinct approaches to the question of

right and wrong, the values upheld by all of them are substantially in agreement

as both presuppose and are based upon the notion that the moral values are

derived from eternally valid standards, “which are ultimately independent

of human cognizance and adherence.” The only difference between them  lies in the manner of their attribution/justification (moral values determined by God vs those inherent in nature).

 

Kamali identifies several features of the nature of the Qurʾān and the Sunna that make them considerably interpretationally “flexible,” “dynamic,” and accommodative of renewalist thinking. First, such a feature is with regard to the nature of the Qurʾānic message and its laws, which Kamali maintains is goal-oriented both in the sphere of ʿibādāt and muʿamalāt. Second, the Qurʾān and the Sunna are primarily embodiments of certain ethico-religious values. In his words:

A cursory perusal of the Qurʾān would be enough to show that the Qurʾān’s

primary concern is with values and objectives such as justice and benefit,

mercy and compassion, uprightness and taqwa, promotion of good and

prevention of evil, fostering goodwill and love among the members of the

family, helping the poor and the needy, cooperation in good work, and

so forth. The Qurʾān may thus be said to be goal-oriented, and that it

seeks to foster a structure of values which has a direct bearing on human

welfare. It is, for the most part, concerned with the broad principles and

objectives of morality and law, rather than with specific details and technical

formulas that occupy the bulk of the uṣūl[BB6]  works.

 

Third, the Qurʾān and its injunctions of sociolegal imports as the principal source of sharīʿa in particular come in form of primarily general principles. He adds that when the Qurʾān does provide more specific detail it does so for the purpose of gaining a better understanding of the general principles. He also argues that the greater part of the Qurʾān, including

its legal verses (ayāt al-akām), consists of general (ʿamm[BB7] ) and unqualified

(muṭlaq[BB8] ) expressions and as such they are on the whole open to further

interpretation.  Kamali also asserts that the Qurʾān is expressive too, at

numerous places and in a variety of contexts, of the goals, purposes, rationale,

and benefits of its laws such as rama (mercy), hudā (guidance), protection

of life, and so on in the spheres of muʿmalāt as well as ʿibādāt.

He considers that this maqāṣid nature of Qurʾān is also signified by the fact that there exists a theme-oriented Qurʾānic commentary genre known as tafsīr mawūʿī[BB9] , whose approach, is conceptualized by Kamali as being goal-oriented.

Kamali also considers that the most notable companions of the Prophet, as embodiment and perpetuators of the Sunna of the Prophet, especially Caliph Umar, took a rational approach

toward the text and message of the Qurʾān and the Sunna and that their understanding and interpretation of the text was not confined to the meaning of words but also included its underlying rationale, effective cause, and purpose.

The reason for this interpretationally flexible nature of the Qurʾān, argues Kamali, is because the Qurʾān wanted the Muslim community and its leaders, the Ūlū l-‘amr, to elaborate on them in light of prevailing conditions.

 

Another feature of the Qurʾān, which is accountable for flexibility and change in the sharīʿa as identified by Kamali, is the presence of speculative (zannī), in contradistinction with definitive (qaṭʿī), rulings throughout the holy Book. Kamali argues that a ruling of the Qurʾān may totally or partially fall under one or the other of these two categories. A qaṭʿi[BB10]  text, which leaves little room for interpretation and ijtihād, is one in which the language of the text and the ruling that it conveys is “clear, self-contained, and decisive,” whereas the zanni[BB11]  texts of the Qurʾān, which Kamali identifies as forming its larger part, are “open to interpretation, analysis, and development.”

Another important delineating feature of the Qurʾān and the Sunna, which makes them inherently dynamic, according to Kamali, is the notion

that, outside of the sphere of the ʿibādāt, they are rationalist in essence. Kamali refers to the concept of taʿlīl (ratiocination) in the Qurʾān as evidence to support this view. In this context he asserts that the Qurʾān “expounds on numerous instances and in a large variety of themes, both legal and nonlegal, the rationale, cause, objective, and purpose of its text, the benefit or reward that accrues from conformity to its guidance or the harm and punishment that may follow from defying it.”

Kamali supports the taʿlil [BB12] nature of the Qurʾān and its laws by making reference to many instances in the Qurʾān where the exercise of sound reasoning and judgment is affirmed, and rational thinking, observations, and conclusions made on their basis are encouraged. Importantly, Kamali links the taʿlil nature of Qurʾān and its laws to the concept of maqāṣid sharīʿa

(and maṣlaḥa). He argues that ta’lil  in the Qurʾān means that the laws of sharīʿa are “not imposed for their own sake, nor for want of mere

conformity to rules, but that their aim is the realization of certain benefits and objectives,” and “when the effective cause, rationale, and objective of an injunction is properly ascertained, they serve as basic indicators of the continued validity of that injunction.” This, in turn, implies that when a ruling of sharīʿa outside the sphere of rituals “no longer serves its original intention and purpose, then it is the proper role of the mujtahid to substitute it with a suitable alternative because the failure to do so would mean neglecting the objective (maqṣud) of the Lawgiver.”

Another salient characteristic of the Qurʾān and the Sunna that makes sharīʿa dynamic and open to change is the idea of their contextualist

nature or what Kamali refers to as the unmistakable presence of the time-space factor in them. Although the general import of the Qurʾān and the inspiration and guidance that it provides tend to transcend particularities of time and space, the Qurʾān also contains specific provisions and concrete rulings, which “like most of the Sunna, involves a time-space element.” If this element is ignored, argues Kamali further, it results in fragmentation and neglect of the internal values of the Qurʾān and the Sunna. As one

argument for the presence of the time-space factor in the Qurʾān and the Sunna (and therefore sharīʿa), Kamali cites the practice of the Prophet to accept the majority of social values of seventh-century Arabia.

 An additional argument in favor of the contextualist nature of the Qurʾān can be found in Kamali’s assertion that “God Most High revealed His message to the people in contemplation of their capacity at receiving it and the realities

with which they were surrounded in Makkah and Madinah respectively.”

The concepts of gradual revelation, abrogation, and replacement of some of its own laws are also cited as evidence of the contextualist nature of the ethico-legal elements in the Qurʾān and the Sunna.

 

Consistent with his tajdīd haḍari approach described earlier, Kamali employs and adapts a number of what I call  maqāṣid-allied concepts existent in classical uṣūl al-fiqh to argue for a maqāṣid-oriented uṣūl al-fiqh as an authentic and legitimate way of  renewing Islamic law. These include maṣlaḥa, istiḥsān, ijtihād, ijmāʿ, qawāʿid (legal maxims), ḥikma, ʿilla,

and asbāb al-nuzūl. However, due to time limitations I am unable to discuss them.

Maqasid oriented Tajdid

Finally, I just want to briefly explain Kamali’s original contribution to maqasid al shari’a for the purposes of maqasid - oriented tajdid.

Regarding the question of the nature of the maqāṣid, Kamali forms the view that they are dynamic and subject to change in tandem with social change and that they resonate more strongly with advancement of essential human rights. In other words, he subscribes to the view that the maqāṣid can evolve with the evolution of civilization. As such Kamali argues for an open-ended scale of values for maqāṣid because “as sharīʿa has no limit nor do the maqāṣid values.”

In this context his words are instructive:

Our understanding of sharīʿa is one of continuing relevance, development,

and growth through independent reasoning (ijtihād), renewal, and

reform (tajdīd,iṣlāḥ). Hence the goals and purposes of sharīʿa must

also remain an evolving chapter of the juristic and civilisational edifice

of Islam.

 

In addition to the maqāṣid identified by classical and some modern scholars he identifies social justice, equality, fundamental freedoms and rights, cultivation of human intellect through education and science, and cooperation as additional maqāṣid.

 Kamali also describes the nature of maqāṣid by maintaining that they must be constant/permanent (ṭabit), zahir ( evident), general (ʿamm), and exclusive and that they must operate without any socio-temporal constrains.

 

Kamali has also developed novel ideas in relation to the issue of the methodology of identification of maqāṣid. In this context he has identified a number of what he terms “principal indicators” or methods of identifying maqāṣid. These include clear and definitive texts (nuṣūs) found in the Qurʾān and ḥadīth: istidlāl (sound reasoning); al-ʿaql (reason); al-tajriba (experience); al-fiṭra (innate nature); and al-istiqrāʿ (corroborative induction).

 

Cognizant of the importance of methodological accuracy in the new maqāṣid theories, Kamali himself has attempted to develop such a theory.

One aspect of it concerns novel interpretation of the Qurʾān itself based on what he terms the “newly developed genre of tafsīr,” or the “maqāṣid-based tafsīr.” Kamali finds antecedents of this new tafsīr genre in the existence of

thematic-based tafsīr (tafsīr mawḍūʿī), which aims to uncover the unity of

theme and content in the Qurʾān. The complementary nature of mawḍūʿī

and maqāṣid tafsīr stems from the fact that the identification of a goal or

purpose is only possible once one has interpretationally taken into account

all of the evidence pertaining to a particular theme or subject matter, which

is the very task of the tafsīr mawḍūʿī. Reflecting this unity of theme and content

in the legislative sphere of the Qurʾān would be the task of the maqāṣid-based

tafsīr.

The final novel aspect of Kamali’s maqāṣid-based tafsīr  I want to mention is that it interpretationally unifies what we could term as “the ethico-religious dimensions” of the Qurʾānic message with those dealing with the aḥkām when interpreting

the legal Qurʾānic injunctions. Kamali argues for the validity of this approach by stating that the Qurʾān is not meant to be a law book but a book of moral and spiritual guidance and as such this implies that the aḥkām verses must share a common purpose with the ethico-religious teachings of the Qurʾān. This, in turn, increases the scope of evidence of ayāt upon which aḥkām are to be made. It integrates the ethico-religious verses with those of the ayāt al aḥkām, all of which are used as indicators (dalāl) to help

identify maqāṣid. This same methodology would also apply to the Sunna, that is, to aḥkām al ḥadīth. With respect to maqāṣid in the Sunna, Kamali adds further that the detailed rulings of ḥadīth must be interpreted in light of the maqāṣid as done by Companions and that specific requirements of the Sunna can be relaxed, interpreted differently, or reversed if these actions realize a higher maqāṣid of sharīʿa.

 

Based on the ideas presented (and additional ones that I did not have time to discuss), Kamali has identified areas that require urgent renewal in contemporary Muslim contexts . These include issues relating to political leadership and methods of succession; support for constitutional government and democracy and support for fundamental constitutional rights and liberties of the individual to name but a few.

 

Conclusion

In conclusion Professor Hashim Kalami has been a major contributor to the discourse on the renewal of Islamic law with specific reference to the role of maqasid al shari’a in this respect. He has developed many innovative and systematic conceptual and methodological insights to the idea of the renewal of Islamic law that can help the Islamic civilisation reawaken and flourish in the 21st century.

 




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