Critical-Progressive Muslims: On Islamic hermeneutics, Gender and Interreligious Dialogue

  Does the Qur’an advocate ethical subjectivism,  ethical objectivism,  or ethical voluntarism ? In other words does the Qur’an assume that what is right can always be known by revelation- independent reason  alone  ; what is right can be known in some cases by revelation- independent reason alone and in others by revelation and revelation- derived sources whereby both of these sources are complementary and in agreement, or in order to know what is right, humans must always rely only on revelation and revelation- derived sources and can never know what is right by independent reason.  This leads us into the widely discussed theme in Islamic tradition of the nature of the relationship between reason and revelation (whose exact relationship is yet to be systematically arrived at.  Elsewhere I demonstrated that the legitimacy and the place of reason in conceptualizing the nature and the interpretation of Qur’an and Sunna during the first three to fou

During the most of the pre-classical period of Islamic thought extending to the first two and a half centuries of the Islamic calendar, a conceptual differentiation between the Qur’an as oral discourse and the Qur’an as text ( mushaf ) was made. [1] This resulted in important differences in interpretative strategies employed by pre-classical and classical Islamic scholars. [2] The Qur’an’s textualisation and its subsequent standardisation [3] and proliferation of hadith compendia brought into the foreground a philologically-centered approach to Qur’anic interpretation. [4] By philologically-centred approach to Qur’anic interpretation I mean that various philological sciences and their role in the process of derivation of (Qur’anic) meaning came to be considered as the Qur’an’s most decisive and hermeneutically powerful interpretational tools. [5]   This, aspect of the pre-modern embedded approaches to the legal theory methodology originating in the writings of   Shafi’i (d.204 AH

  According to Auda, maqāṣid al-sharīʿa “is a system of values that could contribute to a desired and sound application of the Shari’ah” . [i] The concept of maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is present and has been employed as legal hermeneutical tools in premodern Islamic law ( or legal theory ,usul ul fiqh [ii] , to be more precise) since the third century Hijri  at least. [iii] It is based on the idea that Islamic law is purposive in nature, that is to mean that Islamic law serves particular purposes (e.g. promoting people’s benefit and welfare and protecting them from harm) which are either explicitly present in or can be derived from the fountainheads of the sources of Islamic law, namely the Qurʿān   and the Sunna. Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa is also an umbrella concept for a number of  other concepts which have been closely linked to it in the premodern Islamic tradition, most notably  the idea of  a public interests ( al masaliḥ al- ammah ) [iv] and  unrestricted interests ( al-masali ḥ al-mu

This paper  examines the NTS thought with respect to the historical context behind the emergence of the pre-modern  ahl al-hadith  and  ahl ar-ra’y /  madhhab  schools of thought. I first turn my attention to the relationship between NTSm and the pre- modern ahl al-hadith  school of thought. NTS scholars consider themselves to be the inheritors of the pre-modern ahl al-hadith because of their view that this school of thought is the only sect whose manhaj has remained true to the Qur’an and Sunna. For example, Al-Atharee in his book “ Clarification That The Ahlul-Hadeeth Are The Saved Sect and Victorious Group ”, is of the view that the “truth is found in the creed of the Ahlul-Hadith”. [i]  He praises the efforts of individuals who made long journeys in search of even only one narration  collecting and authenticating hadith  and criticizes  the adherents of  ahl ar-ra’y for their reliance on opinion instead of hadith . In this context he asserts the following: Then he [indi